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ABSTRACT
A risk-based decision methodology is presented to support United States Coast
Guard regulators’ determinations of the most appropriate fire safety areas for allocating
research and development resources.  The methodology consists of risk-based analysis of
previous shipboard fire and explosion incidents to establish historical problem areas and
trends.  The analysis results were then presented to a panel of experts in shipboard fire
safety regulations.  An analytical hierarchical process was used to encode these experts’
opinions on subjective attributes of the decision.  Nineteen attributes were selected by the
panel and used to rate eighteen potential research and development alternatives.  The
series of eighteen alternative areas for possible research and development efforts were
ranked using a scoring model.  A sensitivity analysis was performed on the top five
alternatives to assess the relative influence the attributes have on the decision.
Information from two marine casualty databases were analyzed to establish the
historical problem areas and trends.  Fire and explosion incidents were taken from the
United States Coast Guard’s Marine Safety Information System (MSIS) database and
Lloyd’s Maritime Information Service Ltd.’s Casualty System (CASMAN).  Following
the methodology presented, the top five areas for possible allocation of research and
development resources are: egress of passengers and crew, development of international
design & approval standards for fire protection systems, hazard analysis review of fire
safety regulations, development of alternative design assessment methodology, and
investigation of lagging requirements for fire protection.
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1INTRODUCTION
The United States Coast Guard (Coast Guard) is charged, under law, with
promoting and protecting safety, security, and the environment through the regulation of
marine commerce in the United States.  The Coast Guard carries out this assignment
through its Office of Marine Safety and Environmental Protection (G-M).  The Marine
Safety and Marine Environmental Protection programs within this office have
responsibilities to establish federal policies/standards, negotiate international maritime
safety/environmental protection standards, assure U.S. vessel compliance, port state
control, provide security for U.S. ports, and direct response activities to mitigate the
effects of maritime casualties and pollution.
The program’s standards making functions are performed by the Director of
Standards (G-MS) and his staff located in headquarters.  The compliance and response
functions are carried out primarily by field personnel at other Coast Guard locations
including Marine Safety Offices, Marine Inspection Offices, Nation Strike Team
locations, and Vessel Traffic Services locations.
The development of the Federal government’s marine polices and standards as
well as the participation in international maritime safety standards are handled by the
Standards Directorate (G-MS).  Individual divisions within the directorate are responsible
for different areas.   For example, shipboard fire safety issues fall under the responsibility
of the Lifesaving and Fire Safety Division (G-MSE-4).
2To support their regulatory functions and rule interpretations, G-MSE-4 submits
requests for support to the Coast Guard’s Research and Development Program (G-SIR).
The Research and Development Program is a separate program within the Coast Guards
Systems (G-S) office.  G-SIR has a separate line of funding established by Congress
(RDT&E funds) and these funds cannot be used for other than appropriate research and
development efforts.  Each of the other programs within Coast Guard must submit their
requests for research and development support to the R&D Program.
For each request for R&D support, a project proposal is developed along with an
estimate of the amount of time and resources required to complete the requested effort.
All of the Requests are then combined with their project proposals and ranked by a multi-
attribute rating system.
This high level Rating system is performed by R&D program (G-SIR) personnel
with some input from the individual program offices.  The rating system is a scoring
model with attributes of guidance linkages, benefit-to-cost measures, and investment
measures.   The guidance linkages are broken down into scores for linkages to planning
documents (Department of Transportation’s, Commandant’s Executive Business Plan,
and the individual Program’s Business Plan), mandates (whether direct or indirect
support of a mandate), and other guidances (e.g., Commandant’s Determinations, and the
DOT Strategic Agenda).  Benefit-to-Cost measures consist of a Life-Cycle Cost, a Life-
Cycle Benefit, and Figure of Merit scores (the quotient of Life-Cycle Benefit score
divided by the Life-Cycle Cost score).  The Investment Measures’ attribute consists of
scores on probability of success, project size verses the R&D program funds,
3affordability measures, capital investment impact, and Coast Guard operating expenses
impact.  These scores are then used in the multicriteria decision tool known as ELECTRE
to weight the different attributes.   A final ranked list of projects is then created.  The
available RDT&E funds are then distributed to the highest-ranking projects until the
resources are expended.  The individual programs are given an opportunity for reclamas
to the ranking.  A final list of projects to fund, given the projected funding level, is
established.  This process begins two-years before the government budget is set by
Congress and the President.  Any budget cuts or increases are accounted for by the
elimination or addition of the projects in the ranking.
For an individual office’s R&D need to be addressed by the limited R&D
resources, the request must compete within its own program’s list of needs.  The request
must then compete against projects from the other programs for funding in the high level
ranking process described above.  Therefore, the likelihood of a need being addressed by
the R&D Program is very much dependent on the strength of the supporting information
of the request, and the ability to be highly ranked in G-SIR’s process.
A decision support methodology implemented at a this initial level can help
support these needs and assist the requesting offices in selecting the most important areas
to be researched.  By tailoring their own internal ranking process to reflect the goals of
the high level ranking process, their R&D needs will likely be better ranked and
potentially funded.  For the purposes of this effort, the needs of the Lifesaving and Fire
Safety Division (G-MSE-4) will be examined.
4CURRENT DECISION PROCESS
The current decision-making process for this initial selection of fire research areas
and the proposed decision support methodology, share several attributes.  Both include
some historical incident perspective, and encoding of the decision-maker’s “expert
opinion.”  The difference between the current and proposed methodologies lies in the
structuring and documenting of the process.  The greatest benefit will be that the
selection process reflects the higher level ranking process.
Currently the decision-makers receive some information on fire and explosion
incidents.  This might be in the form of an official Coast Guard incident investigation
report or as part of a Commandant’s Review of an accident investigation. The decision-
maker can request casualty data be extracted from the Coast Guard’s casualty database.
They also receive information through various industry trade magazines and newsletters.
The decision-makers are occasionally asked to assist in an accident investigation.
Sometimes they hear of an incident from a broadcast news program or in a newspaper.
There is a weakness in the current method for receiving information on incidents.
The largest or highest profile incidents get most of the attention.  Very few people in
America were unaware of the fire on the cruise Ecstasy.  “It was a cruise marketer’s
worst nightmare.  Hours of continuous live coverage of pillars of smoke billowing from
the stern of the sleek white cruise liner, complete with captions flashing "Cruise Ship
Terror” and the like.” (Blenkey, 1998) was stated in the cover story of a trade magazine.
5This incident was broadcast live over many national news programs and was reported on
in most newspapers.  These high profile incidents often sway the decision-making
process due to public opinion, which can lead to congressional inquiry.  The result is that
smaller incidents that occur more frequently may be overlooked.
A second weakness in the current methodology is the general lack of
documentation of all the factors that went into the decision process.  If the decision-
maker’s perception is that there seem to have been many fires on Offshore Support
Vessels (OSV) recently, the decision might be swayed by that availability heuristic.  The
availability heuristic is defined as the readily available information in a person’s memory
(Tversky, 1973).   Had there been a structured decision-making process, the increase in
frequency for OSV’s would have been captured and available for later review if needed.
The final weakness in the current process is the inability to justify the request in
the selection process.  There are new requirements that make this an important aspect.
The Government Performance and Results Act (Public Law 103-62, August 1993)
requires that all government programs measure their performance and demonstrate the
possible results of the regulation or action.  Regulatory actions must demonstrate that the
benefits of the regulation outweigh the cost of implementing it.  This has resulted in the
investigation of the goal of eventual results much earlier in the process.  This has never
been included in the R&D decision making process.  A structured decision support tool
can include this attribute as well as document the need, which supports the benefits
analysis.
6PROPOSED DECISION METHODOLOGY
The goal of the decision methodology is to improve upon the strengths of the
current process while providing structure and documentation.  It is not the intent of this
effort to fix a broken process, but improve it to better meet the changing requirements.
The proposed decision methodology consists of a risk-based analysis of historical
maritime fire and explosion accidents.  The goal of this analysis is to determine where the
most significant fire and explosion problems are occurring.  Significant fires and
explosions, as used here refer to the type of incidents with the highest product of
probability of occurring times the consequence of it occurring.  The analysis will try to
identify the types of vessels, the locations of the incidents on the vessel, and the sources
of ignition that are responsible for the most significant fires and explosions.  The analyses
should be performed on the best available information, and information should represent
the regulated population.
The next step is the presentation of the data to the decision-makers.  The goal here
is to present the data most useful and in a form that will allow the decision-maker to use
the information as well as document this portion of the decision process.
Once the decision-maker has reviewed the data, the next part of the process is for
the decision-makers to establish the attributes for rating alternatives.  Alternatives as used
here, refer to possible areas for a research and development effort.  Attributes are the
criteria by which to rate those alternatives.  The method presented here is that of a
brainstorming process.  This method encourages the consideration of a wide range of
7attributes and then the selection of the most appropriate ones.  In subsequent decision
processes, this stage may be reconfigured to the brainstorming of potential new attributes
not previously used followed by the selection of the best from existing and new
attributes.
After the attributes are established, they must be ranked according to the relative
importance to each other.  The method selected here was that of the Analytical Hierarchy
Process (AHP).  AHP is a multi-criteria decision analysis methodology that allows
subjective as well as objective factors to be considered in the process (Mustafa, 1991).
Thomas L. Saaty of the Wharton School at the University of Pennsylvania developed
AHP in the early 1970s to help decision-makers deal with the complexity inherent in
multi-criteria based decisions.  AHP allows decision-makers to capture their expert
knowledge of the problem while incorporating both subjective and objective data into a
logical, hierarchic framework.  Above all, AHP provides decision-makers with an
intuitive and common sense approach to evaluating the importance of each attribute
through a pairwise comparison process.
In this process, the ranking of the various attributes is broken down into easier to
analyze pairwise comparisons.  These comparisons allow the attributes to be compared
individually to each other with respect to the goal.  The goal is the decision that is being
modeled.  The attributes are represented as individual nodes in the decision model.
Global nodes are made up from local nodes.  This grouping of like attributes into global
attributes forms the decision model. The individual comparisons are then rolled up into a
complete ranking of the attributes.
8The decision-makers can then establish a list of alternative research areas to be
considered based on the analyzed data presented, as well as their opinions based on their
experiences.  The alternatives can be developed using the same brainstorming process
used for establishing the attributes.  The goal here is to capture all possibilities and allow
the AHP to determine the relative merits of each.  Subsequent decision-making processes
might consider starting with the alternatives of previous efforts that were not chosen and
a reassessment of the attributes.
The final input to the AHP is the rating of the alternatives against the ranked
attributes.  This can be done by the same pairwise comparison process; however, as the
number of alternatives increase, the number of individual decisions can become
unmanageable.  A usual cut-off point is at eight or nine alternatives.  This is also
dependent on the number of attributes.  A simpler process can be selected for rating the
alternatives.  This is simply a two point scale or three point scale established for each of
the lowest level attributes.  In this process, a standard scale is created for each attribute
and the alternative is rated against that scale.  A simple “yes” or “no” two-point scale for
example, is established to rate if an alternative affects the attribute or not.
The ratings from the scaled alternatives and the ranked attributes are then
synthesized.  Synthesis is the process of weighting and combining the inputted priorities
through the decision model to yield the result. Global weights are obtained for nodes
throughout the decision model by applying each node’s local priority by its parent’s
global weight.  The global weights are then summed to yield the overall or synthesized
weights.  The preferred alternative is the one with the highest weight.
9The decision-makers then have a list of alternatives, in order of their weighted
priorities.  The decision-makers can then select from this list the alternatives they want to
submit for allocation of R&D resources.
HISTORICAL INFORMATION
Information on the types of fires and explosions that typically occur reside in
historical incident records.  For shipboard fire and explosion incidents, records are
typically found in casualty databases and are maintained by various organizations.  The
type of information maintained is usually determined by that organization’s informational
needs.  Insurance related organizations, such as the classification societies, collect a range
of data to help in the establishment of insurance rates.  Governmental organizations
collect data to help determine the need for, as well as tracking the effectiveness of
regulations.  Some large shipping companies collect data to assess their companies’
performance.  This information is usually proprietary.
An ideal historical fire and explosion database would consist of a complete listing
of all casualties and significant near misses.  Near misses being described as hazardous
situations where all precursor events happen, that, but for some corrective action in the
chain of events, did not result in the casualty.   The database would provide detailed
information on the casualty and its root causes, and list information regarding the events
and operations leading up to the accident.  Information on repair costs or its constructive
lost value would also be included.  The database would also list consequential losses,
such as an oil spill that resulted from the incident.
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With such a detailed casualty record on incidents and near misses, trends leading
up to problem areas could be identified and possibly avoided.  Problems associated with
changes in technology, ship designs, and types of cargo carried can be identified earlier
and intervention actions taken, such as new regulations or operating procedures.
GOAL OF DATABASES ANALYSES
Two databases were selected to be analyzed to establish the historical incident
rates and trends.  Their selection was based on the uniqueness of each.   The first is the
United States Coast Guard’s Marine Safety Information System (MSIS) database.  The
second is Lloyd’s Maritime Information Services Ltd’s Casualty System (CASMAN)
database.  Both databases were queried for casualties/incidents that involved fire or
explosions on vessels greater than 100 gross tons (g.t.).  The vessel’s size cut-off was
established by the common regulatory size determination for commercial vessels.  The
following is a description of the individual databases.
MSIS DATABASE DESCRIPTION
The United States Coast Guard’s Marine Safety field units have been populating
this database since 1985.  They input incident activity data for a range of safety related
incidents.  The incidents include fires, explosions, collisions, allisions, sinkings, loss of
propulsion, loss of steering and marine pollution occurrences.  The incidents included in
this database are those in which the USCG has conducted an investigation for cause.
These incidents meet the requirements of a reportable casualty criterion as defined in
Title 46 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR).
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The MSIS database was chosen for its coverage of US flagged vessels and all
vessels in US territorial waters that require an investigation for cause.  It includes
incidents on vessels of any flag that occur within US waters.  It includes incidents of US
flagged vessels that occur outside US waters.  The database covers all US navigable
waterways, including lakes, rivers, bays, harbors, sounds, and the oceans out to the
territorial limits.
Relevant attributes of the database are summarized in Table 1, which compares
both databases (MSIS and Lloyd’s) to an ideal data source. The MSIS database is very
good at identifying a primary cause for each of the incidents listed.  Very few of the
records list “unknown” or have blank fields in the source column.  However, it should be
noted that the cause listed is generally not a root cause.  The investigators generally do
not have the time or possibly the expertise to analyze the incident to that degree of detail.
The MSIS database also includes a data field for documenting the location of the
incident on the vessel.  This aids greatly in the resolution of the causal analysis
performed.  It generally lists specific locations on the ship, i.e., engine room, bridge, and
crew’s cabin.  It does not include detail location information, e.g., on top of no. 6 main
engine cylinder head on starboard main engine.  The level of detail in the information is
generally sufficient for a coarse analysis of incident types and trends.
The MSIS database contains information about the amount of damage incurred
and sometimes a dollar value estimate of the incident.  If the damage to the vessel
exceeds the value of the vessel, it is reported as a total constructive loss.  While this
12
reporting has an implied dollar value, there is insufficient information within the database
to determine an actual dollar value of the loss.
Table 1 - Database Comparison
Attribute Included Ideal Source USCG MSIS Lloyd’s
US flagged vessels All All Some
Foreign flagged vessels All Some Some
Incident’s primary clause Always Most Some
Incident’s root cause Always Few Very Few
Location of origin of incident Always Most Most
Equipment or component involved Always Few Few
Damage costs Always Most None
Related consequences Always Few Very Few
Deaths or missing persons Always Always Always
Injuries Always Few None
Vessel’s name Always Always Always
Vessel’s flag of registry Always Always Always
Vessel’s classification society Always Always Always
Vessel’s registered gross tonnage Always Always Always
Operational status at time of incident Always Most Some
Deaths, missing persons, and injuries are also reported in the database.  The
number of deaths and missing persons is probably fairly accurate accounting.  However,
the reported injuries are probably a reporting of significant injuries that required external
13
medical care.  There is no quantification of the seriousness of the injuries.  These could
range from permanent disability to treatment of minor smoke inhalation.
The database contains information on the vessel itself.  It contains the vessel’s
name, flag of registry, classification society, and its gross tonnage.  Gross tonnage is a
derived sizing of a vessel for registry and regulatory purposes.  It is derived from a
calculation of the available space to carry cargo or passengers and does not include
propulsion or crew spaces.  It does not directly correlate to deadweight tonnage, which is
a measure of the weight of seawater it displaces. Analysis based on gross tonnage is
appropriate for this analysis, as the potential end use of the decision will generally be a
regulatory action.
LLOYD’S DATABASE DESCRIPTION
This database is maintained by Lloyd’s Maritime Information Services Limited
(LMIS).  LMIS is a private limited company jointly owned by Lloyd’s Register of
Shipping, the world’s oldest and largest classification society, and Lloyd’s of London
Press Limited, the wholly owned publishing and intelligence subsidiary of the
Corporation of Lloyd’s (Lloyd’s of London).  The database contains records of reported
serious casualties to all propelled sea-going merchant ships in the world of 100 gross tons
and above.  The database contains incidents from 1 January 1978 for all vessel types and
serious and non-serious incidents to tankers since 1 January 1975.  The database is
populated primarily from reports received daily from Lloyd’s Agents and Lloyd’s
Register Surveyors who are situated in over 130 countries.
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The database is considered by the maritime industry to be a good accounting of
incidents on seagoing merchant ships of the world.  It covers all the world’s oceans and
seas.  It does not include military, recreational, and other non-merchant ships.  It does not
include ships on non-international, coastal or inland waterways.  Table 1 summarizes the
relevant database attributes that it contains.
As with the MSIS database, Lloyd’s database contains information about the
vessel (vessel name, flag, classification society, gross tonnage, and deadweight tonnage),
propulsion type, as well as information about the vessel’s owner.  It contains information
on the geographic location of the incident, vessel’s status (moored, underway, etc.), and
vessel’s disposition (scrapped, returned to service, etc.).  Also included is information on
the number of persons killed or missing, but the database does not contain any
information on injuries.  The database also contains multiple text fields into which the
incident can be described in more detail.
The incident records contained in the database are far from complete.  Important
data fields of some records were found blank.  Individual fields may also be lacking
adequate detail.  For example, an incident description might contain no more detail
information than “fire and sank.”  Therefore, analysis as to the causes of the incidents
was not attempted.  Despite shortcomings in some of its data, Lloyd’s database is the
most comprehensive compilation of the world fleet’s casualties.
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DATABASE ANALYSIS
The analysis approach described herein, attempted to use the strengths of the two
databases and minimize the effects of their weaknesses.  Since the Lloyd’s database is
believed to capture the types of incidents and types of vessels occurring worldwide, it
will be used to help establish the historical analysis for the Coast Guard’s efforts relating
to international regulations.  It is important to establish this type of information for the
decision-makers because 90% of the port calls made in the US are made by foreign
flagged vessels (Gilbreath, 1997).  One of the Coast Guard’s primary business areas is to
maintain effective port state control.
For the Coast Guard’s efforts affecting regulations on U.S. flagged vessels, the
data contained in the MSIS database is more appropriate.  These data as a whole cover all
the types of vessels subject to the regulations.  The database’s percentage of incidents by
vessel type differs significantly from the Lloyd’s data.  This is due to the differences in
the incidents recorded in the databases.  Lloyd’s does not gather information on vessels
making only coastal or inland waterway voyages.  Lloyd’s also looks only at merchant
vessels, while the MSIS also includes recreational vessels of applicable size.
In the past ten years, there have been a number of significant changes to the
international fire safety requirements, Safety of Life At Sea (SOLAS) regulations.  These
changes include the requirements for sprinkler systems in passenger vessel’s
accommodations and assembly spaces, adoption of the International Safety Management
(ISM) code, and other changes.  The full compliance dates for these changes vary, and
some are not required for the next 5 to 10 years.  Yet, these changes are already
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appearing in some vessels.  Therefore, the database’s time frame originally selected for
this analysis was the last five complete years (1993 to 1997).  Upon receiving the
databases, it was found that three quarters of 1998 existed in the data from Lloyd’s
database.  Almost the complete year of 1998 existed in the data from the MSIS database
(except for potentially some incidents post-dated in early in 1999.  The additional time
was included in the analysis as it provided the most up to date and relevant information.
This should increase the likelihood that improvements in vessels, due to implemented
regulatory changes, will be evident.
Where information is available on the population of a type of vessel, the
probability values for an incident have been calculated.  Analysis of most of the Lloyd’s
database information includes probability values where appropriate.  Given the
uncertainty with population values for the ‘fleet’ that the MSIS database covers, no
probability values have been determined.
Where appropriate, a Pareto analysis of the data has been performed to identify
the categories with the highest probabilities of casualties.  This analysis is displayed as
Pareto diagrams.  Pareto analysis is a prioritization technique that identifies the most
significant items among many.  The analysis employs the “80-20” rule, which states that
20% of the causes produce 80% of the effects.  The technique can be used in both a
system-level analysis as well as a component level analysis.  The analysis technique is
named for a 19th century Italian economist, Vilfredo Pareto.  He observed that 80% of
Italy's wealth was owned by 20% of the population.
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The vessel types used for this analysis are tank, fishing, freight, passenger/ferry,
tug/OSV, recreational, and another category for miscellaneous types.  The tank vessel
category consists of all bulk liquid carrying vessels.  This includes crude and product oil
tankers.  It also includes chemical carriers.  The fishing vessel category comprises of all
types of vessels associated with harvesting food products from the sea.  This includes
trawlers, factory, processing, and freezer vessels.  The freight category includes dry bulk
cargo, general cargo, container, roll-on roll-off (RoRo) and refrigerated cargo.  The
passenger/ferry category includes all vessels whose primary function includes the
transport of passengers across the water, including ferries which transport passengers
with some cargo and vehicles.  The tug/OSV category includes all vessels whose primary
function is to transport other vessel types or offshore support vessels.  Offshore support
vessels include crew, supply, anchor handling, standby safety vessel, and other vessels
associated with the offshore exploration and production of oil and gas.  Recreational
vessels are large privately owned vessels.  Their size makes them fall within certain
regulatory requirements. The MSIS database contains information on vessels in this
category; Lloyd’s database does not include this type of vessel.
LLOYD’S INCIDENTS ANALYSIS
The Lloyd’s Casualty System (CASMAN) database query resulted in 782 fire and
explosion incidents for the five and three quarters (5 ¾) of a year time frame.  In 1993 the
world fleet size was estimated to be 80,655 vessels as published in Lloyd’s Register of
Shipping World Fleet Statistics, 1997 (Lloyd’s, 1997).  The world fleet size was
estimated to be 85,494 vessels for 1997.  World fleet data for 1998 was not available
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during this analysis.  The average increase in world fleet size per year was 1.4%.  The
median number of registered ships in the seagoing merchant world fleet for those years
was 82,890 vessels. This results in a fire and explosion incident rate for the world fleet of
0.94 %.  The breakdown of the incidents by type of vessel and the world fleet population
can be seen in Figure 1.  The incident rate per year and frequency of occurrence
(incidents per week) is shown in Figure 2.  It shows that there is an average frequency of
a fire or explosion occurrence of 2.6 times per week for those years. There is no
established increasing or decreasing trend evident during this period.
Figure 3 shows the cumulative incidents and frequency of occurrence for the
seven vessel types used in this analysis.  There are no data for recreational vessels in the
Lloyd’s database, so none is shown in the figure.  The frequency of occurrence is
displayed as the number of days between incidents.  Freight, tank, and fishing vessels
clearly have the lowest number of days between occurrences.  These high occurrence
rates for these vessel types clearly identify them for further analysis.
Another method of assessing the fire and explosion incident rate is to calculate the
percentage of vessels disposed of due to fires and explosions from the total number of
vessels that have been disposed.  Another way of saying this is, how many of the vessels
removed from service were due to fires or explosions?  Figure 4 shows the percentage of
vessels disposal of by fires and explosions from the total number of vessels disposed of
by type of vessel.  The figure shows that passenger/ferry vessels and the “other” category
of vessel types have larger percentages (12% and 10% respectively) of disposals from
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fires and explosions.  This area might warrant further investigation because the exact
cause cannot be determined from the data.
The higher fire/explosion disposal to total disposal ratio for these vessel types
cannot just be attributed to the lower overall population of these types vessels.  It could
be related to an actual higher fire and explosion incident rate these types of vessels are
experiencing.  Alternatively, it could be attributed to a higher demand for these types of
vessels, which is causing a decreased disposal rate, as their service life is extended.
Lloyd’s Register of Shipping World Fleet Statistics, 1997, lists “25 years old and greater”
category as having the largest number of vessels.  This does lead to some credibility to
the latter possibility.  However, this data is only a one-year summary and doesn’t reflect
an actual trend.  This issue will be brought out before the panel and their interpretation
will be sought.
MSIS INCIDENTS ANALYSIS
The Coast Guard’s Marine Safety Information System (MSIS) database query resulted in
1250 fire and explosion incidents for the full 6-year time frame, 1993 through 1998.  The
incident rate per year is shown in Figure 5.  There appears to be a slight downward trend
in the number of incidents per year.  The trend, however, does not consistently decline, as
can be seen by the small increase of six incidents in 1997.  This is less than a three
percent increase from the prior year.
24
No. of Incidents
0
50
100
150
200
250
No. of Incidents Per Year in MSIS Database
No. of Incidents 247 212 214 211 217 149
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Figure 5 – Incidents per Year in MSIS Database
25
Due to the range of vessels, multiple flags and vessel registry requirements
included in the MSIS database, there is no accurate way to estimate the size of the fleet of
vessels from which these incidents result.  A breakdown of the number of vessels by
vessel type can be seen in Figure 6.  It also shows a Pareto analysis graphic display of the
incident types.  The vessel type categories of Fishing, Tug/Tow, Passenger, and Freight
make up nearly 80% of the reported incidents, with fishing vessels accounting for the
largest percentage, 33.6%.  Note the MSIS database does contain information on
recreational vessels, not included in the Lloyd’s database.
A comparison by the vessel types in the two databases cannot be easily made.  A
breakdown by vessel type as a percentage of each of the databases’ incidents can be seen
in Figure 7.  In addition to the recreational vessel category, there are significant
differences in all other vessel type categories.  At first appearance, it would seem that the
two databases are incompatible for analysis.  However, despite the inherent difference in
the kinds of vessels for which information is collected on in the two databases,
comparisons can be made.
From the descriptions of the databases above, the differences in Figure 7 can be
justified by the fact that the MSIS database includes a vessel type not in Lloyd’s, as well
as vessels making voyages explicitly excluded by Lloyd’s.  The inclusion of non-ocean
going fishing vessels, passenger vessels, freight vessels, and tow vessels in the MSIS
database certainly explains the differences for those vessel types.  These non-ocean going
vessels would include barges and the associated tow/push vessels, whose voyages are
predominately on inland waterways and coastal routes.
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The MSIS database includes a large population of passenger vessels that Lloyds
does not include.  This includes ferries, coastal excursion (e.g., cruises along the coast,
and whale watching), and large dinner cruise or gaming vessels.  The inclusion of these
additional vessels in other vessel types changes the overall population, which affects the
remaining types (e.g. tank vessels).
INCIDENT LOCATION ANALYSIS
The concurrence between the two databases becomes apparent when analyzing
them  for the locations of the initiation of the fire or explosion incident.  Figure 8 shows
the percentage of incidents by location in a Pareto diagram for the Lloyd’s database.
Pareto analysis shows that incidents in machinery spaces, cargo areas, and the undefined
areas are the location of 86 % of the incidents.   The largest majority of these, 51 % of the
incidents, occurred in machinery spaces onboard the vessels.
Figure 9 shows the percentage of incidents by location in a Pareto diagram for the
MSIS database.  The Pareto analysis identifies machinery spaces and cargo areas as
accounting for almost 75 % of the incidents’ locations.  Again, a majority of these, 57 %
of incidents, occurred in machinery spaces.
For direct comparison of both databases, Figure 10 shows the percentages for
each side by side.  There is good agreement between the two databases for the initiating
locations found.  The percentage of unknown locations is higher in the Lloyds database
due to the nature of the reporting method being less structured than that of the MSIS.
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From this analysis, it is clear that a more detailed investigation into the causes of
the incidents in machinery spaces, cargo areas, and accommodation areas is needed.
Identification of ignition sources in each of these areas should identify any common
causes.
INCIDENT IGNITION SOURCE ANALYSIS
The analysis of ignition sources for each of the three shipboard areas was only
performed on the MSIS database.  This database’s level of detail into the causal factors
facilitates this analysis.  Therefore, the following discussion will be based upon the data
in the MSIS database.  Due to the concurrence of the data from the Lloyd’s database with
regard to location of origin, the findings from the MSIS analysis should be applicable to
both.
Machinery Space Sources
Analysis shows that the location on all the vessels where a majority of the
incidents of fires or explosions initiated is the machinery spaces. Analysis for the specific
ignition source types in the machinery spaces revealed they can be broken down into five
categories.  They are heated/hot surfaces, electrical, internal to machinery, welding/hot
work, or unknown.  The percentages of these categories can be seen in Figure 11.
Heated and hot surfaces account for 45% of the ignition sources.  These typically
involve a spray or spill of flammable liquid onto a heated or hot surface where the
surface’s temperature is high enough to support auto-ignition of the liquid (typically
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450oC for most liquid hydrocarbons).  Figure 12 shows the breakdown of the different
types of hot surfaces found in the incidents.  The surfaces are engine casings or the
engines’ exhaust manifolds, at 62%.  Hot exhaust piping and/or exhaust stack gases
account for 27%.  Another 10% are friction-heated surfaces, such as clutches or brake
pads.  One percent does not fit into any of these three source types.
Electrical accounted for 28% of the sources as seen in Figure 11.  There are two
primary ignition mechanisms under the electrical category.  They are shorts/overheating
of electrical components and ignition of a flammable or combustible liquid/vapors by an
electrical component.  The ignition of the liquid or vapors is usually from a spark, e.g.,
from a motor’s brushes or relay contact shutting, and not from the heat of the item.  The
percentages of each of these can be seen in Figure 13.  Shorts and overheating account
for over two thirds (67%) of these electrical sources.
Cargo Area Sources
Incidents originating in cargo areas were the second highest location found in the
MSIS database.  They accounted for 17.4 % of the incidents.  An analysis of the sources
of ignition for cargo area incidents found eight common sources and a group of unknown
incidents.  Figure 14 shows the result of that analysis.  Electrical shorts and/or sparks
accounted for 21% of the sources, followed closely by hot work and/or welding at 20%.
Unknown sources accounted for 21% of the incidents.  Hot surfaces or sparks from an
exhaust were attributed to 13%.  Arson or crew attributed (cigarettes, etc.), static
electricity/lightening, cargo explosion/fireworks, chemical reaction, and an external
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ignition source (another vessel, shore facility, burning surface spill, etc.) were the
groupings of the other common sources identified.
An analysis to determine which vessel types were accounting for these cargo area
fires resulted in finding that fishing and freight vessels both accounted for 22% of the
these incidents.  This can be seen in Figure 15.  Tank, recreational, tug/OSV, and
passenger/ferry accounted for nearly an equal percentage of the remainder of vessel
types.  Cargo areas listed in the database for recreational vessels are assumed to be ship’s
stores.
Accommodation Space Sources
Fire and explosion incidents in accommodation and superstructure spaces were
the third highest location in the MSIS database.  They accounted for 16.0% of the
incidents.  Analysis for the sources found seven common sources and a grouping of
unknown sources.  Figure 16 shows those results.  As with the cargo area incidents,
electrical shorts and sparks were the leading source.  They accounted for 31% of the
incidents.  Galley and cooking incidents were the second highest source at 25%.
Unknown sources accounted for 19% of the incidents.  Arson or crew attributed
(cigarettes, etc.), hot work/welding, portable heaters, exhaust stacks, and external ignition
sources (another vessel, shore facility, burning surface spill, etc.) were the groupings of
the other sources identified.
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A vessel type analysis to determine which sources were accounting for these
accommodation and superstructure fires was performed.  Figure 17 show the results of
that analysis.  Fishing vessels account for nearly half (48%) of the incidents.  Tug/OSV
and passenger/ferry vessels account for nearly equal percentages (18% and 15%
respectively).  Recreational, freight, tank and other vessels make up the remainder.
The ignition source analysis for machinery spaces indicates that heat/hot surfaces
and electrical are the most common ignition source types.  Further analysis of heated/hot
surfaces indicates that the surfaces on engines, their manifolds, and their exhaust stacks
account for a majority of those ignition sources.  Analyses of the electrical ignition
sources indicate that a majority of these are shorts and overheating of electrical
components.  For cargo area and accommodation/superstructure location incidents,
analyses indicate that the electrical shorts or sparking, galley/cooking sources, and hot
work/welding sources account for the majority of the incidents.
RISK ANALYSIS
Basing a decision on just the number of incidents or the differences in percent
make-up of the incidents does not give a complete representation of the situation.  There
may be a large number of incidents on a certain type of vessel, but these incidents have a
very low consequence (damage cost).  These incidents would not be of greatest interest
from the regulatory standpoint.  Therefore, the decision model should include a
calculation of the risk associated with the alternatives being considered.  Risk is defined
as the product of the probability of occurrence times the consequence of the occurrence.
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From the standpoint of the Coast Guard decision-makers, risk would be the probability of
a casualty occurring times the consequence (cost of the loss) of the casualty.
Any decision-making model should include the use of the best “expert opinion”
available to make the risk calculation.  In this model, the best expert opinion on the
probability and consequences each lie within the separate databases.  Trying to calculate
the risk by vessel types therefore would consist of combining incongruent data.  Due to
the different populations in the two databases, combining the probability of one and the
consequence of the other would be meaningless.
The Lloyd’s database in conjunction with Lloyd’s World Fleet data contains the
best “expert opinion” on the probability of fire or explosion incidents occurring onboard
different types of ships.  It does not, however, have the costs of damages incurred.
The MSIS database contains the best available “expert opinion” on the
consequence of casualties.  The damage values associated with the incidents in the
database provide the best assessment of the losses incurred.  However, due too the lack of
information of the total population of vessels covered, MSIS generated information lacks
the probability of incidents occurring information.
Given this lack of total population data, the probability used in the risk
calculations will be a conditional probability.  The condition chosen is that a fire occurs
on a vessel covered in the population of vessels covered by the MSIS database.  What are
the probabilities of it: it occurring on a given vessel type, it occurring in a given location,
and it occurring due to a given ignition source.
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CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS
The MSIS database has the most useful information regarding the consequences
of the fire and explosion incidents.  It provides information on the number killed or
missing as well as the number injured.  It also lists the estimated value of the losses.
There are numerous incidents where estimated value is not available, so there is a fair
amount of uncertainty associated with these loss values.  Due to the uncertainty with the
information, it is estimated that values could be off by up to 50%.  No additional
information source could be found to substantiate or contradict these values.
The Lloyd’s database lists if the vessel was scrapped or lost, but does not provide
any information on the value of the scrapped or lost vessel.  It does provide information
on the number of persons killed in the incident.  It does not list any missing persons (they
are probably presumed dead and listed as such) nor injury information for the incidents.
There were 46 deaths reported for the 6-year period in the MSIS database.  There
were 4 persons listed as missing and 322 persons injured.  The death and missing rates
for each of the six years is shown in Figure 18.  By the wide variation in the numbers
from year to year, there is no general trend to these numbers.
The total reported estimated damage for the incidents in the MSIS database for
the 6-year period is almost $228 million.  This equates to over $182,000 per report
incident.  The estimated value of the damages per year is shown in Figure 19.  There is an
overall trend towards declining losses.  Figure 20 shows a trend analysis of the loss rates
for that period.  There appears to be a general decline of approximately $9 million dollars
per year.  This is not a consistent decline, as seen by the variation in the year 1996.
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However, as stated above, there is significant uncertainty to these data due to missing
data.
A breakdown of the damage amounts by the seven vessel types is shown in Figure
21.  It shows the cumulative damage cost for the 6-year period and the average cost per
incident.  Fishing vessels have the largest cumulative loss ($71M) of the vessel types.
Tug and Offshore Supply Vessels (OSV) have the second highest loss ($65M).  Tank
vessels have the third highest loss ($59.2M). However, tank vessels have the highest
average cost per incident ($680K/incident).  This can be attributed to the cost difference
in the typical vessels and the severity of a typical incident occurring on tank vessels as
compared to that of other types of vessels.
PROBALITITY ANALYSIS
The following probabilities are based on the condition that a fire has occurred on
a vessel in the population of vessels covered in the MSIS database.  The conditional
probabilities, given a fire, that it will occur on a given vessel type are calculated.  The
conditional probabilities, given a fire that it will originate in a given location onboard the
vessels, are calculated.  And the conditional probabilities, given a fire that it will ignite by
a given ignition source, are calculated.
VESSEL TYPE
The conditional probabilities of incidents by vessel type are calculated in Table 2
on a one-year average number of incidents.  By taking the total number of incidents per
vessel
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type, for the 6-year period and dividing by the number of years provides an average
yearly probability.  The conditional probability of an incident per year on average is then
calculated by dividing the one-year average number of incidents by the total average
yearly number of incidents.
Table 2 – Conditional Probabilities by Vessel Type
Vessel Type Total Incidents Avg. Incidents/Year Conditional
Probability
Incident/Fire/Year
Fishing 420 70.0 0.336
Tug/OSV 274 45.7 0.219
Tank 87 14.5 0.070
Passenger 182 30.3 0.146
Other 71 11.8 0.057
Freight 118 19.7 0.094
Recreational 98 16.3 0.078
Totals 1250 208.3 1.000
LOCATION OF ORIGIN
The conditional probabilities of a fire that has occurred originating in a given
location onboard the vessel are calculated in Table 3.  The locations chosen for this
analysis are machinery spaces, cargo areas, accommodations/superstructure, external to
the vessel, cargo pump rooms, and a general grouping of other locations.  The conditional
51
probabilities are calculated by taking the number of incidents for the given location and
dividing it by the total number of incidents.
Table 3 – Conditional Probabilities for Locations of Origin
Fire Location No. of Incidents Conditional Probability
Incident/Fire
Machinery Spaces 715 0.5720
Cargo Areas 217 0.1736
Accommodations 201 0.1608
External Fire Sources 12 0.0096
Cargo Pump Rooms 8 0.0064
Unknown 97 0.0776
Totals 1250 1.0000
IGNITION SOURCES
To calculate the conditional probabilities of the different ignition sources, it was
determined that the most useful information for the decision-makers would be
decomposing them by the three known locations with the highest probabilities.  These
locations are the machinery spaces, cargo spaces, and accommodation spaces.
Machinery Spaces
The conditional probabilities of fire originating in a machinery space being
ignited by a given source are calculated in Table 4.  The numbers of ignitions per given
source are divided by the total number of incidents that occur in machinery spaces.  The
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ignition sources chosen for analysis are heated/hot surfaces, electrical, internal to
machinery, hotwork/welding, and anywhere the source can be identified.
Table 4 – Conditional Probabilities of Ignition Sources in Machinery Spaces
Ignition Source No. of Incidents Conditional Probability
Mach Sp Source/Fire
Heat/Hot Surfaces 324 0.4538
Electrical 198 0.2773
Internal to Machinery 28 0.0392
Welding/Hotwork 17 0.0238
Unknown 147 0.2059
Totals 714 1.0000
Cargo Spaces
The conditional probabilities of a fire in a cargo area being ignited by a given
source are calculated in Table 5.  The number of ignitions per given source are divided by
the total number of incidents that occur in cargo areas.  The ignition sources chosen for
this analysis are electrical, hotwork/welding, hot surfaces/exhaust sparks,
crew/cigarettes/arson, static electricity/lightening, explosion/cargo/fireworks, chemical
reaction, external to vessel, and sources that could not be determined.
Accommodation Spaces
The conditional probabilities of a fire in an accommodation space being ignited
by a given source are calculated in Table 6.  The number of ignitions per given source are
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Table 5 – Conditional Probabilities of Ignition Sources in Cargo Areas
Ignition Source No. of Incidents Conditional Probability
Cargo Area Source/Fire
Electrical Short/Spark 47 0.2166
Hot Work/Welding 43 0.1982
Hot Surface/Exhaust Sparks 29 0.1336
Crew/Cigarette/Arson 19 0.0876
Chemical Reaction 7 0.0323
External Item 6 0.0276
Static Electricity/Lightening 10 0.0461
Explosion/Cargo/Fireworks 10 0.0461
Unknown 46 0.2120
Table 6 – Conditional Probabilities of Ignition Sources in Accommodation
Spaces
Ignition Source No. of Incidents Conditional Probability
Accom Sp. Source/Fire
Electrical Short/Spark 61 0.3035
Galley/Cooking 48 0.2388
Crew/Cigarette/Arson 16 0.0796
Hot Work/Welding 15 0.0746
Heaters/Portable Heaters 11 0.0547
Hot Surfaces/Exhaust Stack 9 0.0448
External 3 0.0149
Unknown 38 0.1891
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divided by the total number of incidents that occur in accommodation spaces.  The
ignition sources chosen for this analysis are electrical, galley/cooking,
crew/cigarette/arson, hotwork/welding, heaters/portable heaters, hot surfaces/exhaust
stacks, external to vessel, and any sources that could not be identified.
These conditional probabilities are then used with consequence data from the
MSIS database to perform a risk analysis.
RISK CALCULATION
Risk is defined as the product of the probability of occurrence times the
consequence of the occurrence.  For the Coast Guard decision-makers, risk would be the
probability of a casualty occurring times the consequence (cost of the loss) of the
casualty.  Due to the lack of population data on all the vessels that MSIS database
casualties represent, the probability of an incident occurring cannot be calculated.
Therefore, the risk calculations presented here are expected loss calculations.  They are
based on the conditional probability that a fire has occurred on a vessel in the population
of vessels covered in the MSIS database.
EXPECTED LOSS BY VESSEL TYPE
The average yearly-expected loss associated with a fire or explosion incident on
given vessel type, where a fire or explosion incident has occurred, is calculated in Table
7.  It shows that the average yearly expected loss is equivalent to $56,800 dollars on a
fishing vessel with a fire or explosion.  The average yearly expected loss is equivalent to
$52,000 dollars on a tug or offshore supply vessel (OSV) with a fire or explosion.  The
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average yearly expected loss is equivalent to $47,360 dollars on a tank vessel with a fire
or explosion.
Table 7 – Expected Loss per Vessel Type Given a Fire Occurrence
Vessel Type Conditional
Probability
Incident/Fire/Year
Consequence
Damage Cost/Incident
Expected Loss /Fire
(Cost/Incident)
Fishing 0.336 $169,048 $56,800
Tug/OSV 0.219 $237,226 $52,000
Tank 0.070 $680,460 $47,360
Passenger 0.146 $81,868 $11,920
Other 0.057 $122,535 $6,960
Freight 0.094 $59,322 $5,600
Recreational 0.078 $32,653 $2,560
The Coast Guard has the least regulatory control of the two vessel types with the
highest expected loss.  They are fishing vessels and tugs.  In resent years, the Coast
Guard has initiated out reach efforts to industry associations for both of these types of
vessels.  The third highest expected loss is on tank vessels.  These are probably the
highest regulated vessels.  The high expected loss for tank vessels could be attributed to
the higher populations of tank barges to self-propelled vessels.  Barges are less regulated
than self-propelled tank vessels.  However, due to limitations in the data available for this
investigation, separation of these populations was not possible.
56
EXPECTED LOSS BY LOCATION OF ORIGIN
The average yearly-expected loss associated with a fire or explosion, originating
in a given location onboard a vessel, are calculated in Table 8.  The locations are
machinery spaces, cargo areas, accommodations/superstructure, external to the vessel,
cargo pump rooms, and a general grouping of other locations.  The probabilities are from
Table 3 in the previous section.
Table 8 – Expected Loss by Location Given a Fire Occurrence
Fire Location Conditional
Probability
Incident/Fire
Consequence
Damage Cost/Incident/Year
Expected Loss /Fire
(Cost/Year)
Machinery Spaces 0.5720 $15,110,683 $8,643,311
Cargo Areas 0.1736 $4,964,023 $861,754
Accommodations 0.1608 $2,842,929 $457,143
External Fire Sources 0.0096 $45,083 $433
Cargo Pump Rooms 0.0064 $7,859 $50
Unknown 0.0776 $15,027,025 $1,166,097
The location with highest average yearly expected loss, onboard a vessel with a
fire or explosion, is a machinery space.  Its expected loss is over seven times the next
highest location.  The calculations show that the expected loss of a fire or explosion
occurring in a machinery space, on a vessel with a fire is equivalent to $8.6 million
dollars.  This indicates that machinery spaces are an area for attention, and possible
research and development resource allocation.
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EXPECTED LOSS OF IGNITION SOURCES
Table 8 shows three known locations onboard a vessel with the highest expected
loss of fires or explosions are machinery spaces, cargo areas, and accommodation spaces.
Calculation of the expected loss associated with these three areas will potentially help
identify component or system level research areas.  Therefore, the following calculations
are presented.
Ignition Sources in Machinery Spaces
The average yearly expected loss of given ignition source for fires or explosions
originating within a machinery space, onboard a vessel where a fire has occurred, are
calculated in Table 9.
Table 9 - Ignition Source Expected Losses in Machinery Spaces
Ignition Source Conditional
Probability
Mach Sp Source/Fire
Consequence
Damage Cost/Incident/Year
Expected Loss /Fire
(Cost/Year)
Heat/Hot Surfaces 0.4538  $8,062,758  $3,658,731
Electrical 0.2773  $3,906,414  $1,083,291
Internal to Machinery 0.0392  $242,269  $9,501
Welding/Hotwork 0.0238  $2,418,465  $57,582
Unknown 0.2059  $480,778  $98,984
Heated or hot surfaces have the highest expected loss of the sources of ignition
analyzed.  The calculations show that the average yearly expected loss is equivalent to
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$3.7 million dollars from a heated or hot surface, in a machinery space with a fire or
explosion. The average yearly expected loss is equivalent to $1.1 million dollars for an
electrical ignition source, in a machinery space with a fire or explosion.  Both these
ignition sources might warrant investigation and possible research and development
resource allocation.
Ignition Sources in Cargo Areas
The average yearly expected loss associated with a given ignition source for fires
or explosions originating in cargo areas are calculated in Table 10.
Table 10 - Ignition Source Expected Losses in Cargo Areas
Ignition Source Conditional
Probability
Cargo Area Source/Fire
Consequence
Damage Cost/Incident/Year
Expected Loss /Fire
(Cost/Year)
Electrical Short/Spark 0.2166 $2,056,702 $445,461
Hot Work/Welding 0.1982 $930,895 $184,463
Hot Surface/Exhaust
Sparks
0.1336 $510,931 $68,281
Crew/Cigarette/Arson 0.0876 $565,142 $49,482
Chemical Reaction 0.0323 $100,000 $3,226
External Item 0.0276 $110,000 $3,041
Static
Electricity/Lightening
0.0461 $47,594 $2,193
Explosion/Cargo/Fireworks 0.0461 $13,500 $622
Unknown 0.2120 $629,259 $133,391
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Electrical shorts and sparking have the highest expected loss of the ignition
sources in cargo areas with a fire or explosion.  The calculations show that the average
yearly expected loss is equivalent to nearly $450 thousand dollars for electrical ignition
sources of fires or explosions in cargo areas.  If it is determined that cargo areas are a
concern, then electrical ignition should be considered for allocation of research and
development resources.
Ignition Sources in Accommodations
The average yearly expected loss associated with a given ignition sources in an
accommodation space with a fire or explosion, are calculated in Table 11.
Table 11 - Ignition Source Expected Losses in Accommodation Spaces
Ignition Source Conditional
Probability
Accom Sp. Source/Fire
Consequence
Damage Cost/Incident/Year
Expected Loss /Fire
(Cost/Year)
Electrical Short/Spark 0.3035 $882,013 $267,676
Galley/Cooking 0.2388 $771,920 $184,339
Crew/Cigarette/Arson 0.0796 $100,616 $8,009
Hot Work/Welding 0.0746 $327,258 $24,422
Heaters/Portable Heaters 0.0547 $60,333 $3,302
Hot Surfaces/Exhaust Stack 0.0448 $199,350 $8,926
External 0.0149 $63,088 $942
Unknown 0.1891 $438,350 $82,872
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Electrical shorts and sparking are the ignition sources with the highest expected
loss in accommodation spaces.  The calculations show the average yearly expected loss is
equivalent to nearly $270 thousand dollars from electrical ignition sources in
accommodation spaces with a fire or explosion.  If it is determined that accommodation
spaces are of concern, then electrical ignition should be considered for allocation of
research and development resources.
EXPERT PANEL
The panel of experts, for this decision-making methodology, are the decision-
makers themselves.  The majority of individuals on the panel are part of the fire safety
staff of the Lifesaving and Fire Safety Division of the Coast Guard and they deal with the
issues involved in these decisions on a daily basis.  They not only help to identify
problems, but they are instrumental in the process to correcting problems.  Also included
on the panel was a member of the Marine Safety and Environmental Protection Office’s
planning staff who provided the perspective on that program’s goals.  The final member
is a member of the R &D Program’s management team and provided their program’s
perspective.
The eight members of the panel all have engineering degrees.  The degrees range
from Bachelor to Masters.  Their degrees include fire protection engineering, mechanical
engineering, marine transportation, and business administration.  The members are a mix
of Coast Guard officers and civilian employees.  Their ship related experience level
ranges from 3 months to over 30 years, with an average of 13 years.  Their experience
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level related to fire protection range from 1 year to over 30 years, with an average of 15
years.
The composition of the panel varied by the member’s ability to participate in each
of the three panel stages.  The presentation of the database analysis and the brainstorming
session was attended by six members of the panel.  The information was presented to the
other members of the panel either in written form or orally.  The ranking of attributes
questionnaire was completed by seven members of the panel.  The rating of the
alternatives was completed by four members of the panel.  The reduced number of
responses to the alternatives rating has not degraded the value of the input, as there was a
very high degree of consistency in the responses.
PANEL’S MEETING
The panel met at US Coast Guard Headquarters on March 23rd 1999.  The results
of the databases’ analyses were presented and discussed.  The panel felt that the data
reasonably represented the casualty incidents of their collective experience.  There was
no disagreement on the relative breakdown on the problem areas.  Minor corrections in
the presentation of the analysis were suggested and subsequently incorporated into this
work.
After the results of database analyses were presented, the panel was asked to brainstorm
to establish attributes and alternatives.  The attributes will be used to rate the alternatives.
The panel’s selection of attributes and alternatives can be seen in the decision model.
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DECISION MODEL
Given the eighteen alternatives and nineteen attributes by which to rate them, an
AHP decision model was created.  The structure of the model can be seen in the decision
model displayed in Figure 22.  At the highest level of the model is the goal of the
decision to be made.  The goal (GOAL) is to determine the most appropriate fire research
areas or projects that the Lifesaving and Fire Safety Division should request for
allocation of Coast Guard research and development resources.
The goal is decomposed into five general attribute groupings.  They are Mandates,
Program, Vessels Addressed, Pollution, and Collision.  The Mandates group
(MANDATES) is made up of issues that must be addressed by the Coast Guard in its
regulatory efforts.  This includes National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB)
recommendations or the potential for recommendations on marine safety issues made to
Coast Guard, for which a response is required.  Issues (IMOISSUE) before or scheduled
to come before the IMO’s Maritime Safety Committee or its subcommittees.  Issues
(BUSIPLAN) that are in alignment with G-M’s business plan.  Congressional mandated
items (CONGRESS) that the Coast Guard must present a response before Congress.
Issues (PUBOPN) for which there is expected to be significant public opinion either for
or against.  And issues (MARIND) that are likely to have a positive or negative impact on
the marine industry or portions thereof.
The second grouping of attributes (PROGRAM) consists of items related to the
Coast Guard’s R &D Program.  The first is a cost to benefit issue (COSTBENF).  The
second is a timeliness issue (TIME).  Third issue (R&D) is whether the research or
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development needed fits within the funding requirements.  The fourth and final issue
(SUCPROB) is the probability of whether successful resolution to the effort is
anticipated.
The third grouping of attributes (VSLADDR) is made up of the six specific vessel
types the panel chose to address and one general one for all other vessels (OTHERVSL).
The six types are passenger (PASSVSL), tank (TANKVSL), fishing (FISHVSL), high
capacity passenger (HCPV), high speed craft code (HSCVSL), and ferry vessels (FERRY).
The final fourth and fifth groups are single item attributes.  The first is pollution
prevention potential (POLLUTIO).  The second is collision and allision reduction
potential (COLLISIO).
Each of the attributes and alternatives are described as follows.
ATTRIBUTES
A brainstorming session was conducted to formulate the attributes by which to
rate the alternatives.  This was a free discussion and participants were encouraged to
make any recommendations.  The recommendations were discussed and the following
nineteen attributes were selected.  None of the attributes were considered essential, such
that non-favorable ranking would preclude any further consideration in the decision.
1. National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB): This attribute is to rank
whether or not the alternative would affect a current or future finding from the
National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) or the Coast Guard’s Marine
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Incident Board.  The NTSB is an independent investigation organization
within the Department of Transportation.  They are tasked with investigating
significant safety related accidents on any of the country’s transportation
modes (air, highway, marine, or rail).  They report their findings to the
Secretary of Transportation, in which they assign recommendations to the
organizations involved (federal or state government organizations as well as
industry).  The Coast Guard’s Marine Incident Board is the Coast Guard’s
own internal investigation board.  They make recommendations to the
Commandant on their findings.
The Coast Guard is required to respond to the recommendations.  The
response is typically one of three responses.  The first is some action (usually
regulatory) to prevent reoccurrence.  The second is to undertake a further
investigation of the problem (typically a research effort).  The third is dispute
the recommendation based on technical grounds (may or may not involve a
research effort).
For the purposes of ranking potential research areas, it would be desirable to
have any alternative that would impact on a NTSB recommendation to score
higher than one that does not.  Therefore, an alternative that affects a NTSB
issue would be preferred.  An alternative that possibly might impact an issue
would be next highest ranked.  Finally, an alternative that does not would be
the lowest ranked.
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2. International Maritime Organization (IMOISSUE): This attribute ranks
whether or not the alternative is a current or future item before the
International Maritime Organization’s Maritime Safety Council (MSC) or its
Subcommittees.  Issues before the MSC or its Subcommittees can affect
international safety regulations, Safety of Live At Sea (SOLAS).
The Coast Guard is designated as the United States’ representative to this
international regulation forming body under the charter of the United Nations.
As such, the Coast Guard must present the United States’ position on the
formulation of the SOLAS regulations.  These regulations not only affect US
flagged vessels travelling internationally, but also affect foreign flagged
vessels that make port calls in US waters.
Any alternative research and development area that would impact an item
being considered at IMO would be more desirable than one that is not.
Likewise, an alternative that possibly might affect an IMO issue would be the
next desirable.  Finally, one that does not affect an IMO issue would be least
desirable from this perspective.
3. G-M Business Plan (BUSIPLAN): This attribute ranks whether or not the
alternative is within the scope of the Marine Safety and Environmental
Protection Office’s (G-M) business plan.  The business plan defines G-M’s
approach to help the Coast Guard reach its five strategic goals.  The four
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Coast Guard strategic goals encompassed by G-M’s business plan are safety,
protection of natural resources, mobility, and maritime security.
While G-M is carrying out its mission, in support of the four strategic goals, it
has selected specific areas for its business focus.  These include passenger
vessel safety, pollution from tank vessel casualties, preparedness for
catastrophic threats, fishing vessel capsizing/flooding/ sinking, and port state
control.
All alternatives considered would theoretically support G-M’s goals.
This attribute is to rank whether or not an alternative addresses at least one of
the five business focus areas within their business plan.  An alternative that
meets a focus area would rank higher than one that does not.
4. Congressionally Mandated (CONGRESS): This attribute ranks whether or
not the alternative affects a Congressionally mandated issue.  The US
Congress mandates items to the various departments within the government
that it feels warrants action.  The departments must respond to the mandate
and present their findings to Congress.
When the Coast Guard is mandated by Congress to address an issue, it has
several avenues to address the issue.  Several of these might be supported,
either directly or indirectly, by research and development efforts.  For
example, if mandated to reduce oil spills as in the Oil Pollution Act of 1990,
which resulted from, the Exxon Valdez oil spill.  Numerous Coast Guard
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initiatives were undertaken to comply with this mandate, including double
hull requirements for tank vessels, spill response planning, etc.  One area of
research that the Coast Guard chose to pursue was in-situ oil burning.  This is
where burning the oil off the surface of the water reduces an oil spill’s impact.
A Congressionally mandated research effort, where Congress states what they
want researched, would not involve this decision making process.  The
research would just be conducted as directed.  Therefore, for the purposes of
this attribute in the decision making process, it is only referring to
Congressional mandates where the Coast Guard has the option to choose if
research and development is appropriate for the mandated action.  In this case,
if an alternative supported a mandated issue, that would be a desirable result
and would score higher than one that does not support a mandate.
5. Public Opinion (PUBOPN): This attribute ranks whether or not the
alternative is likely to be supported by or opposed by the public, and
specifically the opinion of US taxpayers.  The Coast Guard is federally funded
by the US taxpayers.  While the Congress determines the Coast Guard’s
budget and might mandate issues, it is ultimately the US taxpayers who
determine what the Coast Guard does.  Therefore, an alternative that is likely
to receive public opinion support would be more desirable than one that would
receive public criticism.  That alternative would therefore score higher against
this attribute.
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6. Marine Industry Adverse Impact (MARIND): This attribute ranks whether
or not the alternative will adversely affect the US marine industry.  Under its
strategic goals, the Coast Guard must insure that its regulations do not place
an unfair burden on US commercial vessels.  The Coast Guard has several
initiatives to reduce the burden on the US marine industry by the elimination
of unnecessary regulation.
Any alternative research and development area that has the potential to
adversely affect maritime commerce without a justifiable benefit would be
less desirable than one that has possible positive impact.  Therefore, a positive
impact alternative would score higher than a negative impact.
7. Cost Benefit (COSTBENF): This attribute ranks whether or not the estimated
cost of the alternative is warranted with respect to the expected benefit.  An
alternative that provides higher benefit for less cost, is the more desirable one.
Therefore, an alternative with a lower cost to benefit ratio would score higher.
8. Timely (TIME): This attribute ranks whether the estimated time to complete
the necessary research or development meets the needs of the problem.  A
research effort that can’t be completed until after the issue needs to be
resolved, say to support a final IMO vote, is less desirable than an alternative
that can be completed in a timely manner.  The more timely alternative would
score higher.
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9. Research & Development Funds Needed (R&D): This attribute ranks
whether or not the alternative requires research or development that falls
within the allowances of the RDT&E funding.  Congress imparts strict
requirements on monies provided for research and development.  An issue that
might require investigation, but not research or development work that falls
within the restrictions, is considered to be within the conduct of normal
business and funded with operational funds of that program, not with RDT&E
funds.  The programs are allowed to spend their operational funds to conduct
needed research or development if it is not funded through the R&D program.
This is limited by the availability of operational funds with which to conduct
the research.
A program may decide for example, to fund a low cost research effort that is
of particular importance to an operational effort, but it is not an effort that
would likely be funded through the R&D program.  Therefore, this attribute
not only ranks whether the alternative meets the R&D funding requirements,
but also if the effort will require going to the R&D program for support versus
operationally funding it.  An alternative that meets the funding requirements
and needs R&D program support would score higher than one that doesn’t.
10. Probability of Success (SUCPROB): This attribute ranks the likelihood of
success of either a research or development effort on the alternative.  An
alternative with a higher probability of success would score higher than one
with a low probability of success.
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Which types of vessels does the alternative affect?  Does it affect all vessels, such
as a machinery space item in which all vessels have some type of machinery space?
Does the alternative only affect a specific type of vessel, which may only represent a
small portion of the fleet the Coast Guard regulates?  Alternatively, does it affect a type
of vessel that the Coast Guard currently has limited regulatory control on, i.e. fishing
vessels?
The six vessel types selected as attributes are passenger vessels, tank vessel,
fishing vessels, high capacity passenger vessels, high-speed craft code vessels, ferry
vessels.  One additional category was added to incorporate all vessel types not
specifically addressed.   These seven attributes were grouped into one group, Vessels
Addressed (VSLADDR). The selection of these vessel types as attributes was impacted by
the database analyses presented to the panel.   A detail description of each attributes’
impact follows.
11. Passenger Vessels (PASSVSL): Passenger vessels included in this attribute
are vessels that carry more than 12 passengers.  These vessels can range from
small dinner excursion vessels up through the largest cruise liner with
thousands of passengers.  The potential loss of life on this type of vessel is
much higher. These vessels carry more of the general public than any other
vessel type. Casualties on these vessels draw more attention than almost any
other type.
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The database analysis does not show a significant historical expected loss
associated with this vessel type, see Table 7.  The panel felt that the potential
for the loss of life, and high profile associated with this vessel type warranted
a separate attribute. Reduction of passenger vessel casualties is an area that G-
M has selected as one of its business focus areas.  Therefore, an alternative
that impacts passenger vessels would score higher than one that does not.
12. Tank Vessels (TANKVSL): Vessels included under this attribute are any bulk
liquid cargo-carrying vessel.  This includes crude oil carriers, product carriers,
and chemical carriers.  The vessels range in size from barges up through super
tankers (VLCC’s).  These vessels carry a relatively small number of crew, so
the potential for large loss of life is small.  The impact of a fire or explosion
casualty on one of these vessels can range from spill of its cargo into the water
or a large lethal cloud of toxic gases from the burning cargo.
The database analyses showed that this type of vessel had the highest cost per
incident rate, see Figure 21.  They also have the third highest expected loss,
see Table 7.  Its calculated expected loss given a fire occurrence is 83% of the
highest calculated expected loss.  The panel felt that despite it being a highly
regulated vessel type, it warranted a separate attribute.  An alternative that
affects tank vessels would score higher than one that does not.
13. Fishing Vessels (FISHVSL): Fishing vessels attribute includes commercial
fishing vessels and vessels related to fishing, i.e., processing and freezing
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vessels.  The size of the crew onboard a vessel varies with the size and type of
vessel.  The loss per incident for fires or explosions onboard fishing vessels is
the third highest, Figure 21.  The high conditional probability, given a fire or
explosion on a vessel, that it is a fishing vessel gives it the highest calculated
expected loss, Table 7.
Despite the Coast Guard having the least regulatory control on this vessel
type, its high-calculated expected loss warranted its inclusion as a separate
attribute.  An alternative that affects fishing vessels would score higher than
an alternative that did not affect fishing vessels for this attribute.
14. High Capacity Passenger Vessels (HCPV): High capacity passenger vessels
include very large cruise ships and smaller vessels with a high capacity per
size.  These latter vessels are typically gaming boats that travel routes on
rivers or close to shore.  The routes’ close proximity to external emergency
support allows them to have higher capacities than other vessels.
These vessels are included in the passenger vessel category in the database
analyses.  As with other passenger vessels, the historical calculated expected
loss, given that a fire occurs, does not warrant a separate attribute.  However,
the panel felt that the potential expected loss of high fatalities or injuries if a
fire or explosion did occur, that the separate attribute was justified.
15. High Speed Craft Code Vessels (HSCVSL): High speed craft code vessels
are a special group of vessel under a separate set of regulations under SOLAS.
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The vessels are typically passenger vessels that travel at high speeds.  There
are special provisions for vessels that travel routes in close proximity to
external emergency support.  The code allows the vessel to be constructed to
different material requirements.  While these vessels, like the HCPV, are
included in the passenger vessel category of the database analyses, the panel
felt that the unique aspects of this type of vessel warranted a separate attribute.
This higher perceived risk is related to the panel’s relatively short experience
with this type of vessel.  An alternative that affects a HSC vessel would score
higher than an alternative that did not.
16. Ferry Vessels (FERRY): Ferry vessels are a subset of passenger vessels.
They are categorized as ferries due to the transport of not only passengers, but
also vehicles and some cargo.  Due to unique design considerations to
accommodate vehicles and generally higher passenger carrying capacity, the
panel felt ferry vessels warranted a separate attribute.  This perceived higher
risk probably stems from accidents like the sinking of the MS Estoina, a RoRo
ferry sailing out of Stockholm, Sweden in 1994 with 1054 passengers and
crew onboard.
17. Other Vessels (OTHERVSL): This attribute covers all remaining vessel types
not specifically identified above and was used to insure that the relative
rankings included all possible vessels.
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18. Pollution Prevention (POLLUTIO): This attribute ranks whether or not the
alternative has potential to reduce pollution incidents.  For example, a
machinery space fire prevention improvement might reduce the likelihood of a
vessel loosing steerage while navigating in restrictive waters, thereby reducing
the chance of grounding and subsequent spill.  Therefore, an alternative that
potentially reduces the likelihood of a pollution incident would score higher
than one that does not.
19. Collision/Allision Reduction (COLLISIO): This final attribute ranks whether
or not the alternative has the potential to reduce collisions and allisions.
Allision is the admiralty law term for the inadvertent contact between a vessel
and another fixed object above the water other than another vessel.  A vessel
striking a pier or wharf, as occurred in New Orleans, is an example of an
allision.  Collisions and allisions have the potential for loss of live, sinking of
the vessel, and the release of cargo or ships fuel.  It is desirable to reduce the
potential occurrence of these types of incidents.  An alternative that
potentially could reduce the likelihood of occurrence would score higher than
one that would not under this attribute.
ALTERNATIVES
After the attributes were established, the brainstorming session turned its focus to
identification of alternatives.  These are areas in which research or development work
might improve the fire safety of a vessel.  It might be an item that would affect only a
certain type of vessel, or it might affect all vessels.  The panel was encouraged to put
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forth any ideas.  A general discussion of the alternatives was conducted and the following
eighteen alternatives were selected:
1. Smoke Control Measures: Smoke control measures would consist of
investigations of means of safely managing the removal of smoke in the event of a
fire onboard.  The goal of any effort would be to keep the smoke away from the
passengers and/or crew.  As an example, a research project might be
investigations on ventilation systems that would slightly pressurize either vertical
escape zones or adjacent occupied zones.
Since all vessels have a crew, and some carry passengers, this alternative would
potentially affect all vessel types in the Vessels Addressed (VSLADDR) branch of
the decision tree.  Attributes under the Mandates (MANDATES) and Program
(PROGRAM) branches would have unique responses as to whether or not they are
potentially affected by such an alternative.  The likelihood that any smoke control
measures would reduce the likelihood of either pollution incidents or
collision/allisions is very remote.  Due to the low expected loss calculated in the
database analyses, the inclusion of this alternative is probably based on the
panel’s experience.
2. Arrangement of Equipment in Machinery Spaces: Arrangement of equipment
in machinery spaces might be an investigation of separating machinery space
equipment into compartmentalized areas to prevent a fire from spreading beyond
its point of origin.  Any such effort would need to consider many other functional
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aspects such as manning requirements of such an arrangement, the vessel’s energy
performance impacts, maintainability, and others.
Since all commercial vessels have some type of machinery space (for main
propulsion or auxiliary purposes).  This alternative would potentially affect all
vessel types in the Vessels Addressed (VSLADDR) branch of the decision tree.
Attributes under the Mandates (MANDATES) and Program (PROGRAM) branches
would have unique responses as to whether or not they are potentially affected by
such an alternative.  Since a machinery space fire could adversely affect the
vessel’s propulsion or steering, it is possible that such an alternative could reduce
the chance of Pollution (POLLUTIO) and Collisions/Allisions (COLLISIO).  The
alternative’s selection by the panel is attributable to the high calculated expected
loss, (Table 8), that fires will occur in machinery spaces as found in the database
analyses.
3. Lagging Requirements with Fire Protection as the Goal: Lagging is an
industrial term to denote insulation type materials applied to objects, such as
pipes, manifolds, etc.  In this context, it is referring to the use of lagging materials
on hot surfaces.  Hot surfaces are defined as surfaces with temperatures at or
above the auto-ignition temperature of hydrocarbon fuels.  The current marine
design practice for specifying the need for lagging on hot surfaces falls into one of
two general categories.  One is the need to prevent a burn from accidental contact
by a person’s skin.  The second is to reduce the heat load transferred into the
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space to maintain habitability, thereby reducing the ventilation system size and
power requirements.
A development effort might look at identifying and testing specification
requirements to be applied to lagging to prevent gaps in the lagging large enough
to allow the penetration of an accidental fuel spray from coming in contact with
the hot surfaces and igniting.  This alternative could be effective on all vessel
types, as well as potentially reduce the chance of pollution and
collisions/allisions.  Its selection by the panel is attributable to the high calculated
expected loss, (Table 8), that fires will occur in machinery spaces as found in the
database analyses.
4. Monitoring Techniques for Machinery Spaces: This alternative might include
an investigation of the reduced hazards associated with the use of electronic
sensors versus the current practice of running small diameter gage tubing from an
operational component to a central control board.  These electronic sensors can
eliminate the long runs of pressurized flammable liquids, which are susceptible to
damage, that can lead to fires.
This alternative could be effective on all vessel types, as well as potentially
reduce the chance of pollution and collisions/allisions.  Its selection by the panel
is attributable to the high expected loss, given a fire (Table 8), that fires will occur
in machinery spaces as found in the database analyses.
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5. Machinery Condition Monitoring to Prevent Casualties: This alternative
might consist of investigation of the hazard reduction that might be gained from
the use of sensors or monitoring techniques that could potentially reduce
catastrophic component failures that can result in fires.  The component
monitoring would be based on defining an acceptable range for a parameter.
When the component’s value exceeded that range, it would initiate corrective
action/maintenance before the component could reach the point of catastrophic
failure.
This alternative could be effective on all vessel types, as well as potentially
reduce the chance of pollution and collisions/allisions.  Its selection by the panel
is attributable to the high expected loss, given a fire (Table 8), that fires will occur
in machinery spaces as found in the database analyses.
6. Development of International Design and Approval Standards for Fire
Protection Systems: This alternative might consist of the development of a
method to equate the current prescriptive fire safety requirements for components
to a set of standardized requirements for the design of fire protection systems.
The current prescriptive requirements for components are uniquely applied by the
designer and the approving administration (flag state).  This results in vessels that
“meet” all the same standards yet have a wide spread on their level of actual fire
safety.
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This alternative would potentially affect all vessel types equally.  It has the
potential to also reduce the chance for pollution and collisions/allisions.  An
alternative like this one is not likely to be seen in the data analyses.  Its inclusion
by the panel is probably attributable to their experience.
7. Review of Electrical Standards with respect to Fire Protection: Due to the
expected loss calculated for incidents caused by electrical sources, Tables 9, 10
and 11, it was probably felt by the panel that a fire hazard analysis review of the
current electrical standards would be appropriate.  Such a review with a high
emphasis on fire protection might identify improvements that could reduce the
number of these types of fires.  This alternative would potentially affect all vessel
types, reduce pollution, prevent collisions and allisions.
8. Alternative Fuels as New Types of Cargo, Impact on Existing Systems: Most
requirements for tank vessel cargo deck fire fighting foam systems were
established in the late seventies and early eighties.   Since that time, some types of
cargoes, like gasoline, have been reformulated with chemical additives and blends
of additives.  These additives are used for fuel system cleansing, performance
enhancement, as well as air pollution control. Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether
(MTBE) is an example of an air pollution control additive in gasoline
formulations.  These additives in either neat form or in the final gasoline
formulations can potentially change the effectiveness of the cargo deck
firefighting foam systems.  This alternative might consist of evaluating the
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existing foam systems against new formulations to determine if changes in the
system requirements are necessary.
This alternative would only affect tank vessels.  Under the Tank (TANKVSL)
attribute, this alternative would score high, but score low under the other vessel
types.  It could potentially reduce pollution incident rates so it would score high
there, but is not likely to reduce the chances of collisions or allisions, so it would
not score high under that attribute.  The panel may have included this alternative
because of the calculated expected loss for tank vessels, Table 7.  They also may
have included it based on there experience.
9. Hazard Analysis Review of all Regulations, using a Systems Approach: This
alternative would consist of a hazard analysis of all regulations related to fire
safety as a whole system.  It would encompass the prescriptive material,
suppression system, and detection system requirements, as well as any
performance requirements for a combined “ship system” analysis.  This
alternative could be effective on all vessel types, as well as potentially reduce the
chance of pollution and collisions/allisions.  It would likely score high on all of
these attributes.  The database analysis results would not show any linkage to this
alternative, so the panel probably selected it based on their experience.
10. Egress of Personnel from Machinery Spaces: This alternative would likely
consist of adaptation of existing building-based evacuation models to the inherent
complexities found in shipboard machinery spaces.  Given the high expected loss
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calculated for machinery space fires, Table 8, the panel probably chose to select
this alternative.  With machinery spaces of some type on every commercial
vessel, this alternative would affect all of the vessel type attributes.
11. Egress of Passengers and Crew, including Human Factors Issues: As with the
previous alternative, this one would likely be the adaptation of existing building-
based evacuation models to the unique aspects of shipboard evacuations.   Some
of the unique aspects include that evacuees travel up rather than down, the ship
can be listing to one side or the other, making travelling up stairways more
difficult, the ship can be rolling in a high sea-state, and evacuees must evacuate to
muster stations then board lifeboats.
This alternative would affect all vessels, and especially all passenger vessels.  It
would not affect the chance of pollution, collisions or allisions.  The database
analyses did not get to this level of detail, therefore; the selection by the panel is
probably based on their experience.
12. Firefighting Doctrine Development, including Human Factors Issues: The
methods and techniques used to fight a shipboard fire are often called the
firefighting doctrine.  The unique aspects of shipboard firefighting, flooding and
capsizing potential, make the importance of knowledgeable attack of the fire very
important.  In addition, shipboard construction uses steel bulkheads as fire
boundaries, primarily the ship’s main vertical zone bulkheads.  Even if the
firefighters are on the non-fire side of those bulkheads, they can be subjected to
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high-radiated heat flux.  This can affect their performance due to heat stress as
well as fatigue.   This alternative might consist of research and testing of methods
to reduce the adverse impacts of these aspects.
Since all vessel types experience some fires, this alternative would be applicable
to all those attributes.  Pollution, collisions, and allisions would not directly be
affected by this alternative.  The database analyses did not analyze to the level of
detail to determine the type or effectiveness of any firefighting efforts with the
incidents.  Therefore, this alternative was probably selected by from the panels’
experience.
13. Larger Passenger Ships (high capacity) Hazard Analysis: This alternative
would consist of performing a hazard analysis on large passenger ships.  It would
address the unique problems associated with large passenger ships.  These include
evacuation issues (safe-haven locations onboard verses lifeboats), smoke
movement, maintaining integrity of the main vertical zones, flooding issues, and
others.  This alternative would only affect passenger vessels; so it would score
highly for that attribute and low for the remaining vessel types.  It would not
affect pollution reduction or reduce the likelihood of collision or allision.  The
database analyses did not identify passenger vessels as one of the highest
expected loss vessel types.  Therefore, the panel’s selection of this alternative was
based on their perception that the potential for the loss of life, and high profile
associated with this vessel type warranted its inclusion. Reduction of passenger
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vessel casualties is an area that G-M has selected as one of its business focus
areas.
14. Satellite or Internet Based Hazardous Incident Assistance Hotline: Shipboard
fire casualties have numerous unique aspects, some of which where identified in
the Alternative 12 above.  The expertise to deal effectively with these situations
may not exist onboard or the knowledgeable person(s) may be missing or
incapacitated.  This alternative might consist of investigating the requirements of
information that might be kept in a user supported international assistance hotline.
The hotline would be available via some commonly available communications
vehicle.  It might provide the onboard response person with important
information, stability calculations, or assistance in determining the most
appropriate method of attack.  This might be an extension of the Atlantic
Merchant Vessel Emergency Reporting System, AMVER, a now worldwide
vessel of opportunity assistance program maintained by the Coast Guard.
This alternative would be applicable to all vessel types.  Pollution, collisions, and
allisions could be affected by this alternative.  The database analyses did not
analyze to the level of detail to determine the type or effectiveness of any
assistance response might have with the incidents.  Therefore, this alternative was
probably selected by from the panels’ experience.
15. Double Hull Void Spaces Hazard Analysis: This alternative would consist of a
fire hazard analysis of tank vessel double hull void spaces.  Double hull
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requirements for tank vessels were required by the Oil Pollution Act of 1990,
which resulted from the Exxon Valdez oil spill.  Due to cracking of the tank’s
boundaries from the ship’s movement and bending while at sea, small leaks can
develop into these void spaces.  Depending on the cargo’s flammability, explosive
atmospheres can develop in these spaces.  This alternative might consist of a
hazard analysis of these spaces to determine that appropriate safety measures are
taken to prevent the ignition of these atmospheres.  This alternative would only be
applicable to tank vessels and could reduce the chances of a pollution incident
related to an explosion and fire within these spaces.  The database analyses did
not identify this location as a high expected loss.  Therefore, the panels selection
is probably based upon their experience.
16. Alternatives to Welding: This alternative would probably consist of an
investigation of alternative methods of repair to the vessel’s structure without
welding.  It would probably investigate epoxy type adhesives that would fasten
the steel without the need to weld it.   Hotwork (cutting using a torch) and
welding was identified as the ignition source with the second highest expected
loss in cargo space fires, Table 10.  It is the fourth highest ignition source
expected loss in accommodation space fires, Table 11.  It was a lower expected
loss in machinery spaces, Table 9.  This alternative affects all vessel types but
would not affect the chance of pollution, collisions, and allisions.
17. Hazard Analysis of Alternative Construction Techniques: Shipbuilders are
investigating new method of constructing ships.  One method that reduces time
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and therefore cost, is the fastening of bulkhead joints with adhesives as opposed
to traditional mechanical fastening or welding.  This alternative would consist of a
hazard analysis, and possibly testing the ability of this technique to resist the
passage of flame or loss of its fastening ability.   This could potentially affect all
vessel types and could have some impact on the chances of pollution, collisions,
and allisions.   The database analyses did not identify this area as a problem area.
18. Development of an Alternative Design Assessment Methodology: This
alternative would develop a methodology that shipbuilders or owners could use to
prove alternative designs provide equivalent level of safety to the regulations.
Currently, if an alternative design is contemplated, the party must request
approval of the design based upon its equivalency.  A standard method does not
exist by which the Coast Guard assesses the equivalency of the alternative.  This
alternative would develop a methodology for that determination.  This could
potentially affect all vessel types and would not impact the chances of pollution,
collisions, and allisions.   The database analyses did not analyze to a level of
detail to identify this as a problem area.  This is clearly a case where the panel
experience resulted in the selection of this alternative.
EXPERT CHOICE™ SOFTWARE
A software package was chosen to perform the AHP.  The software is Expert
Choice™ Professional version 9.5.  It is one of a group of decision making software
packages from Expert Choice, Inc. located in Pittsburgh, PA.  It is a Microsoft
Windows™ based software program that is run on a personal computer (PC).  It is based
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on the Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP), the multicriteria or multiobjective decision
making process developed by Thomas L. Saaty.
ANALYSIS OF ENCODED OPINIONS
The analysis of the decision model used three of the programs modules.  The first
was the Evaluation and Choice module.  The model’s structure was entered into the
module.  The large number of alternatives would have made the resulting pairwise
comparison of all attributes and alternatives an arduous task.  One hundred seventy one
(171) pairwise comparisons would have been required for each panel member.
Therefore, the Ratings module portion of the software was incorporated into the analysis.
Rating was done by structuring the decision model into the Evaluation and Choice
module down to the alternatives level.  Rather than entering the eighteen alternatives, two
or three-point intensity scales were entered.  An example of an intensity scale is the one
used for the NTSB attribute.  It is a three-point scale, Affects, Possible, and No Affect.
The program’s three-point standard scores of  0.711, 0.243, and 0.046 were assigned to
them respectively.  For attributes with a two-point scale, e.g., Meets and Doesn’t Meet,
scores of 0.900 and 0.100 were assigned to those respectively.  The goal of assigning an
intensity scale was to use a simple standard rating criterion that could be quickly used
across the numerous alternatives.
The attributes were pairwise compared by the panel in the form of questionnaires.
Figure 23 is an example of the MANDATES questionnaire. See Appendix A for a
complete sample set of the questionnaires answered by panel members.  Each attribute
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Node: 10000
Compare the relative IMPORTANCE with respect to:  MANDATES < GOAL
1=EQUAL    3=MODERATE    5=STRONG    7=VERY STRONG    9=EXTREME   
1 NTSB 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 IMOISSUE
2 NTSB 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 BUSIPLAN
3 NTSB 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 CONGRESS
4 NTSB 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 PUBOPN
5 NTSB 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 MARIND
6 IMOISSUE 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 BUSIPLAN
7 IMOISSUE 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 CONGRESS
8 IMOISSUE 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 PUBOPN
9 IMOISSUE 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 MARIND
10 BUSIPLAN 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 CONGRESS
11 BUSIPLAN 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 PUBOPN
12 BUSIPLAN 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 MARIND
13 CONGRESS 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 PUBOPN
14 CONGRESS 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 MARIND
15 PUBOPN 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 MARIND
Abbreviation Definition
Goal Determine the most appropriate fire research areas/projects.
MANDATES Addresses mandates or regulatory issues.                        
NTSB   NTSB Recommendation issue                                       
IMOISSUE IMO issue                                                       
BUSIPLAN Fits into G-M business plan                                     
CONGRESS Congressional Mandate                                           
PUBOPN Public Opinion                                                  
MARIND Adverse Impact on Marine Industry                               
Determine the most appropriate fire research areas/projects.
RDC
Figure 23 – Mandates Attribute Questionnaire
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was compared against all other attributes on that level of the model.  The panel’s inputs
were synthesized into priorities for the attributes, Figure 24.  A zero to one numerical
scale was assigned to the priority scales.  The MANDATES branch had the highest
priority in the panel’s opinion.  The Congressional Mandate (CONGRESS) attribute had
the highest priority under the MANDATES branch.  This result would be expected
considering Congress’ ultimate control over the Coast Guard.  The POLLUTION and
COLLISION branches had high priorities, probable due to their tie to G-M’s Business
Plan.
The model, with the derived priorities, was then converted into the Ratings
module of the software.  Here the eighteen alternatives are entered and the intensity scale
for each alternative assigned to make up the ratings’ criteria. .  A zero to one numerical
scale was assigned to the intensity scales.  Figure 25 shows a portion of the MANDATES’
rating questionnaire.  See Appendix B for the complete sample set of ratings’
questionnaires.
The panel’s input from the rating of the alternatives’ questionnaires were then
inputted into the Ratings module.  The ratings were combined using the priorities
established for each of the attributes and a resulting ranking of the alternatives was
established.  Table 12 shows the relative rankings of the eighteen alternatives, from
highest to lowest.  The table also shows the percentage of the maximum for each of the
alternatives.  The complete decomposition of the model with derived priorities for the top
five alternatives can be seen in Appendix C.
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Priorities
Determine the most 
appropriate fire 
research area/project 
for R&D resource 
allocation.
GOAL
Mandates
R&D Program
Vessels 
Addressed
Pollution 
Prevention
Collision 
Reduction
NTSB Issue
IMO Issue
G-M Business 
Plan
Congressional 
Mandate
Marine Industry 
Impact
Cost 
Benefit
Timely
R&D 
Need
Probability  
Of Success
Passenger
Tank
Fishing
High Capacity 
Passenger
High Speed 
Craft Code
Ferry
Others
.022
.073
.038
.170
Public Opinion.026
.049
.013
.008
.038
.015
.044
.017
.013
.056
.033
.037
.010
.378
.075
.208
.159
.179
1.00
Figure 24 – Model with Panel’s Priorities
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G-M Bussiness Plan
Affects Possible No Affects Issue Possible Not Meets Does Not
Smoke Control Measures
Mach Space - Arrangement of equipment
Mach Space - Lagging wrt Fire Protection
Mach Space - Monitoring techniques to red cas
Mach Space - Monitoring of equipment condition
Int’l design & approval stds for Fire Prot Systems
Electrical standards review wrt Fire Protection
Alternative Fuels as cargo wrt Fire Prot
Hazard Analysis Review of Regulations
Egress of Mach Spaces
Egress of Passengers & Crew
Fire fighting doctrine development incl HF
Larger Passenger Ship hazard analysis
Satellite/Internet call up hazard assistance
Double hull void space hazard analysis
Alternatives to welding
Alt construction techniques haz anal - adhesives, etc.
Develop alt design assessment methodology
NTSB issues IMO issue
Areas of for Possible Research
Figure 25 – Mandates Alternatives Rating Questionnaire
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Table 12 - Alternatives’ Ratings
No. Alternative Rating
Score
% of Maximum
1 Egress of Passengers & Crew 0.5272 100.0%
2 Int’l design & approval stds. for Fire Prot Systems 0.5152 97.7%
3 Hazard Analysis Review of Regulations 0.5099 96.7%
4 Develop alt design assessment methodology 0.5066 96.1%
5 Mach Space - Lagging wrt Fire Protection 0.4857 92.1%
6 Satellite/Internet call up hazard assistance 0.4668 88.5%
7 Mach Space - Monitoring techniques to red casu 0.4648 88.2%
8 Fire fighting doctrine development incl. HF 0.4583 86.9%
9 Alternatives to welding 0.4548 86.3%
10 Mach Space - Monitoring of equipment condition 0.4496 85.3%
11 Double hull void space hazard analysis 0.4463 84.6%
12 Smoke Control Measures 0.4459 84.6%
13 Larger Passenger Ship hazard analysis 0.4418 83.8%
14 Alt construction techniques haz. anal. - adhesives
etc.
0.4038 76.6%
15 Egress of Mach Spaces 0.4013 76.1%
16 Electrical standards review wrt Fire Protection 0.3984 75.6%
17 Mach Space - Arrangement of equipment 0.3329 63.1%
18 Alternative Fuels as cargo wrt Fire Protection 0.3176 60.3%
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The results of the decision analysis indicate that the most appropriate alternative
is Egress of Passengers & Crew (EGRESS O).   Considering the issues within the
MANDATES, PROGRAM, vessels addressed (VSLADDR), POLLUTION, and
COLLISION attributes, it meets more of those objectives than the other seventeen
alternatives.  As can be seen in the percentage of maximum column, there is a tight
grouping in the top four or five alternatives.
SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
For sensitivity analyses on the results, the top five alternatives were converted to a
relative model between those five and analyzed in the Sensitivity module of the software.
Here the relative influence of the attributes can be assessed by plotting the gradient
sensitivity.  These plots are graphical linear representations of the alternative’s ratings
against each of the attributes’ priorities.
Figures 26 through 30 show the sensitivity graphs for each of the five top-level attributes.
In each, the bold solid vertical line represents the encoded priority of the panel plotted on
the x-axis.  The priorities of the alternatives are plotted on the slanted vertical lines
against the y-axis.  The highest plotted alternative for any given value of priority of the
attribute is displayed.  The location where one alternatives line crosses another’s is called
the trade-off point.  The value on the attribute’s axis (x-axis) is where one alternative
would be traded-off for the other.  The dashed vertical lines are located at the trade-off
points for the alternatives for the various plotted attributes.
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Abbreviation Definition
MANDATES Addresses mandates or regulatory issues.                        
PROGRAM R&D Program issues.                                             
VSLADDR Vessels Addressed                                               
POLLUTIO Pollution Prevention potential.                                 
COLLISIO Collision and Allision reduction potential.                     
Egress o Egress of Passengers & Crew                                     
Int’l de International Design & Approvals Standards for Fire Protection Sy
Hazard A Hazard Analysis Review of Regulations                           
Develop Develop Alternative Design Assessment Methodology               
Mach Spa Investigate Machinery Space Lagging wrt Fire Protection         
Distributive Mode
Gradient Sensitivity w.r.t. GOAL for nodes below GOAL
 (What-If Scenario)
Figure 26 – MANDATES Sensitivity Graph
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Abbreviation Definition
MANDATES Addresses mandates or regulatory issues.                        
PROGRAM R&D Program issues.                                             
VSLADDR Vessels Addressed                                               
POLLUTIO Pollution Prevention potential.                                 
COLLISIO Collision and Allision reduction potential.                     
Egress o Egress of Passengers & Crew                                     
Int’l de International Design & Approvals Standards for Fire Protection Sy
Hazard A Hazard Analysis Review of Regulations                           
Develop Develop Alternative Design Assessment Methodology               
Mach Spa Investigate Machinery Space Lagging wrt Fire Protection         
Distributive Mode
Gradient Sensitivity w.r.t. GOAL for nodes below GOAL
 (What-If Scenario)
Figure 27 – PROGRAMS Sensitivity Graph
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Abbreviation Definition
MANDATES Addresses mandates or regulatory issues.                        
PROGRAM R&D Program issues.                                             
VSLADDR Vessels Addressed                                               
POLLUTIO Pollution Prevention potential.                                 
COLLISIO Collision and Allision reduction potential.                     
Egress o Egress of Passengers & Crew                                     
Int’l de International Design & Approvals Standards for Fire Protection Sy
Hazard A Hazard Analysis Review of Regulations                           
Develop Develop Alternative Design Assessment Methodology               
Mach Spa Investigate Machinery Space Lagging wrt Fire Protection         
Distributive Mode
Gradient Sensitivity w.r.t. GOAL for nodes below GOAL
 (What-If Scenario)
Figure 28 – Vessels Addressed (VSLADDR) Sensitivity Graph
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Abbreviation Definition
MANDATES Addresses mandates or regulatory issues.                        
PROGRAM R&D Program issues.                                             
VSLADDR Vessels Addressed                                               
POLLUTIO Pollution Prevention potential.                                 
COLLISIO Collision and Allision reduction potential.                     
Egress o Egress of Passengers & Crew                                     
Int’l de International Design & Approvals Standards for Fire Protection Sy
Hazard A Hazard Analysis Review of Regulations                           
Develop Develop Alternative Design Assessment Methodology               
Mach Spa Investigate Machinery Space Lagging wrt Fire Protection         
Distributive Mode
Gradient Sensitivity w.r.t. GOAL for nodes below GOAL
 (What-If Scenario)
Figure 29 – POLLUTIONS Sensitivity Graph
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Abbreviation Definition
MANDATES Addresses mandates or regulatory issues.                        
PROGRAM R&D Program issues.                                             
VSLADDR Vessels Addressed                                               
POLLUTIO Pollution Prevention potential.                                 
COLLISIO Collision and Allision reduction potential.                     
Egress o Egress of Passengers & Crew                                     
Int’l de International Design & Approvals Standards for Fire Protection Sy
Hazard A Hazard Analysis Review of Regulations                           
Develop Develop Alternative Design Assessment Methodology               
Mach Spa Investigate Machinery Space Lagging wrt Fire Protection         
Distributive Mode
Gradient Sensitivity w.r.t. GOAL for nodes below GOAL
 (What-If Scenario)
Figure 30 – COLLISIONS Sensitivity Graph
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Figure 26 shows the sensitivity gradient graph for the MANDATES attribute.  It
shows that if MANDATES had lower priority in the panel opinion, at a value of 0.34
versus the current value of 0.37, then Hazard Analysis Review of Regulations (HAZARD
A) would be the preferred alternative over the current Egress of Passengers & Crew
(EGRESS O) alternative.  This represents the fact that more of the MANDATES issues
are affected by Egress of Passengers & Crew (EGRESS O) alternative than the Hazard
Analysis Review of Regulations (HAZARD A) alternative.
Figure 27 shows the sensitivity gradient graph for the PROGRAM attribute.  It
shows the tradeoff point with then Hazard Analysis Review of Regulations (HAZARD A)
occurs just slightly below the current priority.  This is essentially saying that from the
point of view of the PROGRAM’s issues, the two alternatives are identical.
Figure 28 shows the sensitivity gradient graph for the vessels addressed
(VSLADDR) attribute.  It shows that the two alternatives, Egress of Passengers & Crew
(EGRESS O) and the Hazard Analysis Review of Regulations (HAZARD A) priorities are
equal across the seven vessel type groupings.  Neither alternative has a higher priority.
Figure 29 shows the sensitivity gradient graph for the POLLUTION attribute.  It
shows that a trade-off to the Hazard Analysis Review of Regulations (HAZARD A)
alternative occurs if POLLUTION had a higher priority with the panel.
Figure 30 shows the sensitivity gradient graph for the COLLISION attribute.  It
shows that a trade-off point between the Egress of Passengers & Crew (EGRESS O) and
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the Hazard Analysis Review of Regulations (HAZARD A) alternatives occur if
COLLISION had a higher priority with the panel.
The sensitivity analysis indicates the two alternatives, Egress of Passengers &
Crew (EGRESS O) and the Hazard Analysis Review of Regulations (HAZARD A) have
very similar priorities and that only slight changes in the encoded priorities could result in
the inverse of their final rating.  Therefore selection of one alternative over the other
would not be a significant deviation from the panel’s encoded priorities.
CONCLUSIONS
The risk-based decision methodology presented in this work was used to generate
a ranked list of potential areas for fire research and development resource allocation.  The
work was performed for the United States Coast Guard, to support its regulatory
programs on fire safety for commercial vessels.  The ranking of the list of possible areas
was derived from a six-step process.
The first step was the determination of historical fire problems with the highest
risk for commercial vessels under the Coast Guards’ regulatory authority.  This was
performed by analyzing information from two marine casualty databases.  An expert
panel of fire safety regulatory decision-makers was then assembled.  Expected loss
analysis of the historical casualty information from the two databases was used to inform
to the panel.  A multi-attribute decision model was constructed based on the panel’s
recommendations.  The panel then performed pairwise comparisons of the attributes to
establish the relative importance of each attribute.  The comparisons were then
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synthesized using an Analytical Hierarchy Process in a commercial software package.
The panel also formulated eighteen alternative areas for possible R & D resource
allocation.  The alternatives were rated against the attributes using a simple two or three-
point scoring model.  The rating results were totaled to generate the ranked list of
alternative fire research areas.  Sensitivity analysis was performed to assess the relative
importance of the different attributes.  The results were then presented to the Coast Guard
decision-makers to assist them in their research and development resource allocation
efforts.
The methodology presented here has three main attributes that should be very
beneficial to the Coast Guard.  The first is that it calculates the expected loss for various
vessel types, fire origin locations on the vessels, and the ignition sources based on
documented historical incidents.  The past decision process was more subject to the
availability heuristic bias.  The decision-makers could easily be swayed by one or two
large fire incidents or their perception of a trend in incidents occurring.  The process
however does not prevent this type of potentially valuable “expert opinion” from being
encoded into the calculations.  Instead, it attempts to foster the best of both expert
encodings, the panel’s knowledge and the historical casualty information.
The second beneficial attribute of the method is that it is aligned with the
Research and Development Program’s (G-SIR) rating system.  By having this low level
method use similar attributes as used in the higher level rating system, areas for research
and development that are submitted for R&D resource allocation will be better aligned
for ranking well in the higher level rating system.
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The final benefit of the method is that it provides documentation of the decision.
This can be useful at a later point when questions may arise as to why a particular
research effort was undertaken.  More importantly, it provides important measurement
data points for the Marine Safety and Environmental Protection program’s efforts to
comply with the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA).  This law requires
that all government programs measure their performance and demonstrate the results of
their efforts.  Regulatory actions must demonstrate that the benefits of the regulation out
weigh the cost of implementing it.  This method will support these types of efforts in the
R&D decision making process.
The analysis of the information from the two databases resulted in the
identification of fishing vessels as the vessel type with the highest expected loss given
that a fire occurs on a vessel.  The second highest expected loss occurs with tug and
offshore supply vessel types. Analysis of the location of origin of a fire on a vessel
indicated that machinery spaces had the highest expected loss.  Cargo areas and
accommodation spaces were the second and third highest expected loss locations.
Analysis of ignition sources identified hot surfaces and electrical ignitions as the highest
expected loss in machinery spaces and electrical ignitions as the highest expected loss in
cargo areas as well as accommodation spaces.  The risk analysis was limited by the lack
of vessel population data for the fleet that encompasses all of the incidents in the Coast
Guard’s MSIS database.  If reliable estimates for the population of this fleet can be
found, the risk analysis presented here could be strengthened to a true risk calculation.
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Lloyd’s database lacked severity information (cost of damages), so risk calculations
could not be performed on its information.
The decision-making process resulted in a list of ranked research and
development areas for possible consideration for research and development resources
allocation.  The top five alternatives were subjected to a sensitivity analysis to determine
the relative importance each rating attribute had on the respective rankings.  This analysis
indicated that the top two alternatives had similar priorities and that with only slight
changes in the encoded attributes’ priorities could have resulted in a reversal of their final
ranking.  The top two alternatives were Egress of Passengers & Crew (EGRESS O) and
the Hazard Analysis Review of Regulations (HAZARD A).  Therefore, selection of one
alternative over the other would not be a significant deviation from the panel’s encoded
priorities.
From this decision-making effort, the Coast Guard should consider for possible
allocation of research and development resources the Egress of Passengers and Crew
(EGRESS O) alternative and the Hazard Analysis Review of Regulations (HAZARD A)
alternative.  Either of these two areas will address the greatest number of high-expected
loss problem areas found in the historical casualty information.
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A - 1
APPENDIX A
Attributes Questionnaire
A - 2
NTSB
IMOISSUE
BUSIPLAN
MANDATES CONGRESS
PUBOPN
MARIND
COSTBENF
TIME
PROGRAM R&D
SUCPROB
GOAL
PASSVSL
TANKVSL
FISHVSL
VSLADDR HCPV
HSCVSL
FERRY
OTHERVSL
POLLUYES
POLLUTIO POLLUNOT
COLLISIO REDUCE
NOAFFECT
Determine the most appropriate fire research areas/projects.
RDC
A - 3
Distributive Mode
Abbreviation Definition
  GOAL 
ADVERSE Adverse public opinion possible.                                
AFFECTS Affects this vessel type.                                       
BUSIPLAN Fits into G-M business plan                                     
BUSNOT Does not meet G-M’s business plan goals.                        
COLLISIO Collision and Allision reduction potential.                     
CONGRESS Congressional Mandate                                           
COSTBENF Cost Benefit                                                    
DOESN’T Doesn’t address this vessel type.                               
FERRY  Ferry Vessles                                                   
FISHVSL Fishing Vessel safety                                           
HCPV   High Capacity Passenger vessel                                  
HSCVSL High Speed Craft Code vessels                                   
IMOISSU Will affect an IMO issue.                                       
IMOISSUE IMO issue                                                       
IMONOT No affect on IMO issues expected.                               
IMOPOSS Will possibly affect IMO issue or future IMO issue.             
LIKELY Success in the project likely.                                  
MANDATE Congressial Mandated item.                                      
MANDATES Addresses mandates or regulatory issues.                        
MANDNOT Not Congressionally mandated issue.                             
MARADVRS Adversely impacts on marine industry.                           
MARIND Adverse Impact on Marine Industry                               
MARNEUTR Neither supports or adversely impacts marine industry.          
MEETS  Meets G-M Business Plan.                                        
NEGATIVE Has negative cost benefit.                                      
NOAFFECT Will likely have no affect on reducing collisions and allisions.
NOTR&D Issue requires no R&D effort.                                   
NOTTIME Expected results will not meet anticipated time requirements.   
NTSB   NTSB Recommendation issue                                       
NTSBISSU Will directly affect NTSB issue.                                
NTSBNOT No affect on any NTSB issues.                                   
NTSBPOSS Possible will affect NTSB issue.                                
OTHERVSL Other Vessel type.                                              
PASSVSL Affect passenger vessels                                        
POLLUNOT Not likely to reduce potential for pollution incidents.         
POLLUTIO Pollution Prevention potential.                                 
POLLUYES Likely will reduce potential for pollution incidents.           
POSITIVE Has positive cost benefit.                                      
POSSIBLE Success of project is possible.                                 
PROGRAM R&D Program issues.                                             
PUBOPN Public Opinion                                                  
R&D    Is R&D needed?                                                  
REDUCE Potential to reduce collision and allision incidents.           
SUCPROB Probability of success of an effort.                            
SUPPORT Has public opinion support.                                     
SUPPORTS Will support marine industry.                                   
TANKVSL Affect Tank vessels safety                                      
TIME   Time to complete                                                
TIMELY Will timely meet needs.                                         
UNLIKELY Success of project is unlikely.                                 
VSLADDR Vessels Addressed                                               
YESR&D R&D efforts are needed.                                         
Determine the most appropriate fire research areas/projects.
RDC
A - 4
Node: 0
Compare the relative IMPORTANCE with respect to:  GOAL
1=EQUAL    3=MODERATE    5=STRONG    7=VERY STRONG    9=EXTREME   
1 MANDATES 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 PROGRAM
2 MANDATES 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 VSLADDR
3 MANDATES 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 POLLUTIO
4 MANDATES 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 COLLISIO
5 PROGRAM 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 VSLADDR
6 PROGRAM 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 POLLUTIO
7 PROGRAM 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 COLLISIO
8 VSLADDR 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 POLLUTIO
9 VSLADDR 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 COLLISIO
10 POLLUTIO 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 COLLISIO
Abbreviation Definition
Goal Determine the most appropriate fire research areas/projects.
MANDATES Addresses mandates or regulatory issues.                        
PROGRAM R&D Program issues.                                             
VSLADDR Vessels Addressed                                               
POLLUTIO Pollution Prevention potential.                                 
COLLISIO Collision and Allision reduction potential.                     
Determine the most appropriate fire research areas/projects.
RDC
A - 5
Node: 10000
Compare the relative IMPORTANCE with respect to:  MANDATES < GOAL
1=EQUAL    3=MODERATE    5=STRONG    7=VERY STRONG    9=EXTREME   
1 NTSB 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 IMOISSUE
2 NTSB 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 BUSIPLAN
3 NTSB 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 CONGRESS
4 NTSB 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 PUBOPN
5 NTSB 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 MARIND
6 IMOISSUE 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 BUSIPLAN
7 IMOISSUE 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 CONGRESS
8 IMOISSUE 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 PUBOPN
9 IMOISSUE 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 MARIND
10 BUSIPLAN 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 CONGRESS
11 BUSIPLAN 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 PUBOPN
12 BUSIPLAN 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 MARIND
13 CONGRESS 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 PUBOPN
14 CONGRESS 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 MARIND
15 PUBOPN 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 MARIND
Abbreviation Definition
Goal Determine the most appropriate fire research areas/projects.
MANDATES Addresses mandates or regulatory issues.                        
NTSB   NTSB Recommendation issue                                       
IMOISSUE IMO issue                                                       
BUSIPLAN Fits into G-M business plan                                     
CONGRESS Congressional Mandate                                           
PUBOPN Public Opinion                                                  
MARIND Adverse Impact on Marine Industry                               
Determine the most appropriate fire research areas/projects.
RDC
A - 6
Node: 20000
Compare the relative IMPORTANCE with respect to:  PROGRAM < GOAL
1=EQUAL    3=MODERATE    5=STRONG    7=VERY STRONG    9=EXTREME   
1 COSTBENF 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 TIME
2 COSTBENF 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 R&D
3 COSTBENF 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 SUCPROB
4 TIME 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 R&D
5 TIME 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 SUCPROB
6 R&D 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 SUCPROB
Abbreviation Definition
Goal Determine the most appropriate fire research areas/projects.
PROGRAM R&D Program issues.                                             
COSTBENF Cost Benefit                                                    
TIME   Time to complete                                                
R&D    Is R&D needed?                                                  
SUCPROB Probability of success of an effort.                            
Determine the most appropriate fire research areas/projects.
RDC
A - 7
Node: 30000
Compare the relative IMPORTANCE with respect to:  VSLADDR < GOAL
1=EQUAL    3=MODERATE    5=STRONG    7=VERY STRONG    9=EXTREME   
1 PASSVSL 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 TANKVSL
2 PASSVSL 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 FISHVSL
3 PASSVSL 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 HCPV
4 PASSVSL 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 HSCVSL
5 PASSVSL 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 FERRY
6 PASSVSL 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 OTHERVSL
7 TANKVSL 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 FISHVSL
8 TANKVSL 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 HCPV
9 TANKVSL 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 HSCVSL
10 TANKVSL 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 FERRY
11 TANKVSL 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 OTHERVSL
12 FISHVSL 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 HCPV
13 FISHVSL 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 HSCVSL
14 FISHVSL 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 FERRY
15 FISHVSL 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 OTHERVSL
16 HCPV 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 HSCVSL
17 HCPV 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 FERRY
18 HCPV 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 OTHERVSL
19 HSCVSL 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 FERRY
20 HSCVSL 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 OTHERVSL
21 FERRY 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 OTHERVSL
Abbreviation Definition
Goal Determine the most appropriate fire research areas/projects.
VSLADDR Vessels Addressed                                               
PASSVSL Affect passenger vessels                                        
TANKVSL Affect Tank vessels safety                                      
FISHVSL Fishing Vessel safety                                           
HCPV   High Capacity Passenger vessel                                  
HSCVSL High Speed Craft Code vessels                                   
FERRY  Ferry Vessles                                                   
OTHERVSL Other Vessel type.                                              
Determine the most appropriate fire research areas/projects.
RDC
B - 1
APPENDIX B
Ratings Questionnaire
Mandates1
GOAL: Determine the Most appropriate fire research areas/projects
Rating of Alternatives for Mandate Issues. Check the appropriate box for each alternative area listed
Affects Possible No Affects Issue Possible Not Meets Does Not
Smoke Control Measures
Mach Space - Arrangement of equipment
Mach Space - Lagging wrt Fire Protection
Mach Space - Monitoring techniques to red cas
Mach Space - Monitoring of equipment condition
Int’l design & approval stds for Fire Prot Systems
Electrical standards review wrt Fire Protection
Alternative Fuels as cargo wrt Fire Prot
Hazard Analysis Review of Regulations
Egress of Mach Spaces
Egress of Passengers & Crew
Fire fighting doctrine development incl HF
Larger Passenger Ship hazard analysis
Satellite/Internet call up hazard assistance
Double hull void space hazard analysis
Alternatives to welding
Alt construction techniques haz anal - adhesives, etc.
Develop alt design assessment methodology
Areas of for Possible Research
NTSB issues IMO issue G-M Bussiness Plan
Mandates2
GOAL: Determine the Most appropriate fire research areas/projects
Rating of Alternatives for Mandate Issues. Check the appropriate box for each alternative area listed
Mandate Not Supportive Adverse Supports Neutral Adverse
Smoke Control Measures
Mach Space - Arrangement of equipment
Mach Space - Lagging wrt Fire Protection
Mach Space - Monitoring techniques to red cas
Mach Space - Monitoring of equipment condition
Int’l design & approval stds for Fire Prot Systems
Electrical standards review wrt Fire Protection
Alternative Fuels as cargo wrt Fire Prot
Hazard Analysis Review of Regulations
Egress of Mach Spaces
Egress of Passengers & Crew
Fire fighting doctrine development incl HF
Larger Passenger Ship hazard analysis
Satellite/Internet call up hazard assistance
Double hull void space hazard analysis
Alternatives to welding
Alt construction techniques haz anal - adhesives, etc.
Develop alt design assessment methodology
Areas of for Possible Research
Congressional Public Opinion Marine Industry Impact
Program1
GOAL: Determine the Most appropriate fire research areas/projects
Rating Alternatives for Program Issues. Check the appropriate box for each alternative area listed
Positive Negative Timely Not Yes No Likely Possible Unlikely
Smoke Control Measures
Mach Space - Arrangement of equipment
Mach Space - Lagging wrt Fire Protection
Mach Space - Monitoring techniques to red cas
Mach Space - Monitoring of equipment condition
Int’l design & approval stds for Fire Prot Systems
Electrical standards review wrt Fire Protection
Alternative Fuels as cargo wrt Fire Prot
Hazard Analysis Review of Regulations
Egress of Mach Spaces
Egress of Passengers & Crew
Fire fighting doctrine development incl HF
Larger Passenger Ship hazard analysis
Satellite/Internet call up hazard assistance
Double hull void space hazard analysis
Alternatives to welding
Alt construction techniques haz anal - adhesives, etc.
Develop alt design assessment methodology
Probability of Success
Areas of for Possible Research
Cost Benefit Time Requirements R&D is needed
Vessel1
GOAL: Determine the Most appropriate fire research areas/projects
Rating Alternatives for Vessels Addressed. Check the appropriate box for each alternative area listed
Affected Not Affected Not Affected Not Affected Not
Smoke Control Measures
Mach Space - Arrangement of equipment
Mach Space - Lagging wrt Fire Protection
Mach Space - Monitoring techniques to red cas
Mach Space - Monitoring of equipment condition
Int’l design & approval stds for Fire Prot Systems
Electrical standards review wrt Fire Protection
Alternative Fuels as cargo wrt Fire Prot
Hazard Analysis Review of Regulations
Egress of Mach Spaces
Egress of Passengers & Crew
Fire fighting doctrine development incl HF
Larger Passenger Ship hazard analysis
Satellite/Internet call up hazard assistance
Double hull void space hazard analysis
Alternatives to welding
Alt construction techniques haz anal - adhesives, etc.
Develop alt design assessment methodology
High Cap Pass Vsls
Areas of for Possible Research
Passenger Vsls Tank Vessels Fishing Vsls
Vessel2
GOAL: Determine the Most appropriate fire research areas/projects
Rating Alternatives for Vessels Addressed. Check the appropriate box for each alternative area listed
Affected Not Affected Not Affected Not
Smoke Control Measures
Mach Space - Arrangement of equipment
Mach Space - Lagging wrt Fire Protection
Mach Space - Monitoring techniques to red cas
Mach Space - Monitoring of equipment condition
Int’l design & approval stds for Fire Prot Systems
Electrical standards review wrt Fire Protection
Alternative Fuels as cargo wrt Fire Prot
Hazard Analysis Review of Regulations
Egress of Mach Spaces
Egress of Passengers & Crew
Fire fighting doctrine development incl HF
Larger Passenger Ship hazard analysis
Satellite/Internet call up hazard assistance
Double hull void space hazard analysis
Alternatives to welding
Alt construction techniques haz anal - adhesives, etc.
Develop alt design assessment methodology
Areas of for Possible Research
High Speed Craft Ferry Other Vessels
C - 1
APPENDIX C
Decomposition of the Model with Derived Priorities
for the Top Five Alternatives
C -
 2
Node: 0
Compare the relative IMPORTANCE with respect to:  GOAL
PROGRAM VSLADDR POLLUTIO COLLISIO
MANDATES 5.3 2.3 1.8 2.1
PROGRAM (2.1) (2.1) (2.9)
VSLADDR 1.6 1.5
POLLUTIO (1.2)
Row element is __ times more than column element unless enclosed in ()
Abbreviation Definition
Goal Determine the most appropriate fire research areas/projects.
MANDATES Addresses mandates or regulatory issues.                        
PROGRAM R&D Program issues.                                             
VSLADDR Vessels Addressed                                               
POLLUTIO Pollution Prevention potential.                                 
COLLISIO Collision and Allision reduction potential.                     
MANDATES .378
PROGRAM .075
VSLADDR .208
POLLUTIO .159
COLLISIO .179
Inconsistency Ratio =0.02
Determine the most appropriate fire research areas/projects.
RDC
Goal Plex w/Derived Priorities
C -
 3
Node: 10000
Compare the relative IMPORTANCE with respect to:  MANDATES < GOAL
IMOISSUE BUSIPLAN CONGRESS PUBOPN MARIND 
NTSB   (4.6) (2.1) (6.8) 1.1 (1.7)
IMOISSUE 1.9 (3.6) 2.7 1.9
BUSIPLAN (5.5) 1.3 1.0
CONGRESS 3.9 3.3
PUBOPN (3.2)
Row element is __ times more than column element unless enclosed in ()
Abbreviation Definition
Goal Determine the most appropriate fire research areas/projects.
MANDATES Addresses mandates or regulatory issues.                        
NTSB   NTSB Recommendation issue                                       
IMOISSUE IMO issue                                                       
BUSIPLAN Fits into G-M business plan                                     
CONGRESS Congressional Mandate                                           
PUBOPN Public Opinion                                                  
MARIND Adverse Impact on Marine Industry                               
NTSB   .058
IMOISSUE .194
BUSIPLAN .101
CONGRESS .449
PUBOPN .069
Determine the most appropriate fire research areas/projects.
RDC
Mandates Plex w/Derived Priorities
C -
 4
Node: 11000
Data with respect to:  NTSB < MANDATES < GOAL
Egress o .56133
Int’l de .24966
Hazard A .06498
Develop .06498
Mach Spa .24966
Abbreviation Definition
Goal Determine the most appropriate fire research areas/projects.
MANDATES Addresses mandates or regulatory issues.                        
NTSB   NTSB Recommendation issue                                       
Egress o Egress of Passengers & Crew                                     
Int’l de International Design & Approvals Standards for Fire Protection Sy
Hazard A Hazard Analysis Review of Regulations                           
Develop Develop Alternative Design Assessment Methodology               
Mach Spa Investigate Machinery Space Lagging wrt Fire Protection         
Egress o .471
Int’l de .210
Hazard A .055
Develop .055
Mach Spa .210
Inconsistency Ratio =0.0
Determine the most appropriate fire research areas/projects.
RDC
NTSB Issues Plex w/Derived Priorities
C -
 5
Node: 12000
Data with respect to:  IMOISSUE < MANDATES < GOAL
Egress o 1.
Int’l de .76762
Hazard A .22228
Develop .76762
Mach Spa .76762
Abbreviation Definition
Goal Determine the most appropriate fire research areas/projects.
MANDATES Addresses mandates or regulatory issues.                        
IMOISSUE IMO issue                                                       
Egress o Egress of Passengers & Crew                                     
Int’l de International Design & Approvals Standards for Fire Protection Sy
Hazard A Hazard Analysis Review of Regulations                           
Develop Develop Alternative Design Assessment Methodology               
Mach Spa Investigate Machinery Space Lagging wrt Fire Protection         
Egress o .284
Int’l de .218
Hazard A .063
Develop .218
Mach Spa .218
Inconsistency Ratio =0.0
Determine the most appropriate fire research areas/projects.
RDC
IMO Issues Plex w/Derived Priorities
C -
 6
Node: 13000
Data with respect to:  BUSIPLAN < MANDATES < GOAL
Egress o .40741
Int’l de 1.
Hazard A 1.
Develop 1.
Mach Spa .7037
Abbreviation Definition
Goal Determine the most appropriate fire research areas/projects.
MANDATES Addresses mandates or regulatory issues.                        
BUSIPLAN Fits into G-M business plan                                     
Egress o Egress of Passengers & Crew                                     
Int’l de International Design & Approvals Standards for Fire Protection Sy
Hazard A Hazard Analysis Review of Regulations                           
Develop Develop Alternative Design Assessment Methodology               
Mach Spa Investigate Machinery Space Lagging wrt Fire Protection         
Egress o .099
Int’l de .243
Hazard A .243
Develop .243
Mach Spa .171
Inconsistency Ratio =0.0
Determine the most appropriate fire research areas/projects.
RDC
G-M Business Plan Plex w/Derived Priorities
C -
 7
Node: 14000
Data with respect to:  CONGRESS < MANDATES < GOAL
Egress o .40741
Int’l de .40741
Hazard A .11111
Develop .11111
Mach Spa .11111
Abbreviation Definition
Goal Determine the most appropriate fire research areas/projects.
MANDATES Addresses mandates or regulatory issues.                        
CONGRESS Congressional Mandate                                           
Egress o Egress of Passengers & Crew                                     
Int’l de International Design & Approvals Standards for Fire Protection Sy
Hazard A Hazard Analysis Review of Regulations                           
Develop Develop Alternative Design Assessment Methodology               
Mach Spa Investigate Machinery Space Lagging wrt Fire Protection         
Egress o .355
Int’l de .355
Hazard A .097
Develop .097
Mach Spa .097
Inconsistency Ratio =0.0
Determine the most appropriate fire research areas/projects.
RDC
Congressional Mandate Plex w/Derived Priorities
C -
 8
Node: 15000
Data with respect to:  PUBOPN < MANDATES < GOAL
Egress o 1.
Int’l de 1.
Hazard A .7037
Develop .7037
Mach Spa .55556
Abbreviation Definition
Goal Determine the most appropriate fire research areas/projects.
MANDATES Addresses mandates or regulatory issues.                        
PUBOPN Public Opinion                                                  
Egress o Egress of Passengers & Crew                                     
Int’l de International Design & Approvals Standards for Fire Protection Sy
Hazard A Hazard Analysis Review of Regulations                           
Develop Develop Alternative Design Assessment Methodology               
Mach Spa Investigate Machinery Space Lagging wrt Fire Protection         
Egress o .252
Int’l de .252
Hazard A .178
Develop .178
Mach Spa .140
Inconsistency Ratio =0.0
Determine the most appropriate fire research areas/projects.
RDC
Public Opinion Plex w/Derived Priorities
C -
 9
Node: 16000
Data with respect to:  MARIND < MANDATES < GOAL
Egress o .342
Int’l de .56133
Hazard A .68833
Develop .68833
Mach Spa .78067
Abbreviation Definition
Goal Determine the most appropriate fire research areas/projects.
MANDATES Addresses mandates or regulatory issues.                        
MARIND Adverse Impact on Marine Industry                               
Egress o Egress of Passengers & Crew                                     
Int’l de International Design & Approvals Standards for Fire Protection Sy
Hazard A Hazard Analysis Review of Regulations                           
Develop Develop Alternative Design Assessment Methodology               
Mach Spa Investigate Machinery Space Lagging wrt Fire Protection         
Egress o .112
Int’l de .183
Hazard A .225
Develop .225
Mach Spa .255
Inconsistency Ratio =0.0
Determine the most appropriate fire research areas/projects.
RDC
Adverse Marine Impact Plex w/Derived Priorities
C -
 10
Node: 20000
Compare the relative IMPORTANCE with respect to:  PROGRAM < GOAL
TIME   R&D    SUCPROB
COSTBENF 2.0 (3.3) (1.2)
TIME   (3.3) (2.1)
R&D    2.9
Row element is __ times more than column element unless enclosed in ()
Abbreviation Definition
Goal Determine the most appropriate fire research areas/projects.
PROGRAM R&D Program issues.                                             
COSTBENF Cost Benefit                                                    
TIME   Time to complete                                                
R&D    Is R&D needed?                                                  
SUCPROB Probability of success of an effort.                            
COSTBENF .180
TIME   .110
R&D    .507
SUCPROB .203
Inconsistency Ratio =0.02
Determine the most appropriate fire research areas/projects.
RDC
R & D Program Issues Plex w/Derived Priorities
C -
 11
Node: 21000
Data with respect to:  COSTBENF < PROGRAM < GOAL
Egress o 1.
Int’l de .7037
Hazard A .7037
Develop .7037
Mach Spa .7037
Abbreviation Definition
Goal Determine the most appropriate fire research areas/projects.
PROGRAM R&D Program issues.                                             
COSTBENF Cost Benefit                                                    
Egress o Egress of Passengers & Crew                                     
Int’l de International Design & Approvals Standards for Fire Protection Sy
Hazard A Hazard Analysis Review of Regulations                           
Develop Develop Alternative Design Assessment Methodology               
Mach Spa Investigate Machinery Space Lagging wrt Fire Protection         
Egress o .262
Int’l de .184
Hazard A .184
Develop .184
Mach Spa .184
Inconsistency Ratio =0.0
Determine the most appropriate fire research areas/projects.
RDC
Cost Benefit Plex w/Derived Priorites
C -
 12
Node: 22000
Data with respect to:  TIME < PROGRAM < GOAL
Egress o 1.
Int’l de .7037
Hazard A .40741
Develop .11111
Mach Spa 1.
Abbreviation Definition
Goal Determine the most appropriate fire research areas/projects.
PROGRAM R&D Program issues.                                             
TIME   Time to complete                                                
Egress o Egress of Passengers & Crew                                     
Int’l de International Design & Approvals Standards for Fire Protection Sy
Hazard A Hazard Analysis Review of Regulations                           
Develop Develop Alternative Design Assessment Methodology               
Mach Spa Investigate Machinery Space Lagging wrt Fire Protection         
Egress o .310
Int’l de .218
Hazard A .126
Develop .034
Mach Spa .310
Inconsistency Ratio =0.0
Determine the most appropriate fire research areas/projects.
RDC
Time to Complete Plex w/Derived Priorities
C -
 13
Node: 23000
Data with respect to:  R&D < PROGRAM < GOAL
Egress o 1.
Int’l de .7037
Hazard A .7037
Develop 1.
Mach Spa .40741
Abbreviation Definition
Goal Determine the most appropriate fire research areas/projects.
PROGRAM R&D Program issues.                                             
R&D    Is R&D needed?                                                  
Egress o Egress of Passengers & Crew                                     
Int’l de International Design & Approvals Standards for Fire Protection Sy
Hazard A Hazard Analysis Review of Regulations                           
Develop Develop Alternative Design Assessment Methodology               
Mach Spa Investigate Machinery Space Lagging wrt Fire Protection         
Egress o .262
Int’l de .184
Hazard A .184
Develop .262
Mach Spa .107
Inconsistency Ratio =0.0
Determine the most appropriate fire research areas/projects.
RDC
Is R & D Needed Plex w/Derived Priorities
C -
 14
Node: 24000
Data with respect to:  SUCPROB < PROGRAM < GOAL
Egress o .78067
Int’l de 1.
Hazard A .46899
Develop .342
Mach Spa .78067
Abbreviation Definition
Goal Determine the most appropriate fire research areas/projects.
PROGRAM R&D Program issues.                                             
SUCPROB Probability of success of an effort.                            
Egress o Egress of Passengers & Crew                                     
Int’l de International Design & Approvals Standards for Fire Protection Sy
Hazard A Hazard Analysis Review of Regulations                           
Develop Develop Alternative Design Assessment Methodology               
Mach Spa Investigate Machinery Space Lagging wrt Fire Protection         
Egress o .231
Int’l de .297
Hazard A .139
Develop .101
Mach Spa .231
Inconsistency Ratio =0.0
Determine the most appropriate fire research areas/projects.
RDC
Probability of Success Plex w/Derived Priorities
C -
 15
Node: 30000
Compare the relative IMPORTANCE with respect to:  VSLADDR < GOAL
TANKVSL FISHVSL HCPV   HSCVSL FERRY  OTHERVSL
PASSVSL 3.6 4.0 (1.6) 1.0 1.4 3.5
TANKVSL 1.3 (3.2) (1.8) (2.5) 2.2
FISHVSL (3.1) (2.7) (3.0) 1.3
HCPV   2.4 1.5 4.6
HSCVSL (1.1) 3.4
FERRY  3.7
Row element is __ times more than column element unless enclosed in ()
Abbreviation Definition
Goal Determine the most appropriate fire research areas/projects.
VSLADDR Vessels Addressed                                               
PASSVSL Affect passenger vessels                                        
TANKVSL Affect Tank vessels safety                                      
FISHVSL Fishing Vessel safety                                           
HCPV   High Capacity Passenger vessel                                  
HSCVSL High Speed Craft Code vessels                                   
FERRY  Ferry Vessles                                                   
OTHERVSL Other Vessel type.                                              
Determine the most appropriate fire research areas/projects.
RDC
Vessels Addressed Plex w/Derived Priorities Part 1
C -
 16
PASSVSL .209
TANKVSL .080
FISHVSL .062
HCPV   .268
HSCVSL .156
FERRY  .176
OTHERVSL .048
Inconsistency Ratio =0.01
Determine the most appropriate fire research areas/projects.
RDC
Vessels Addressed Plex w/Derived Priorities Part 2
C -
 17
Node: 31000
Data with respect to:  PASSVSL < VSLADDR < GOAL
Egress o 1.
Int’l de 1.
Hazard A 1.
Develop 1.
Mach Spa 1.
Abbreviation Definition
Goal Determine the most appropriate fire research areas/projects.
VSLADDR Vessels Addressed                                               
PASSVSL Affect passenger vessels                                        
Egress o Egress of Passengers & Crew                                     
Int’l de International Design & Approvals Standards for Fire Protection Sy
Hazard A Hazard Analysis Review of Regulations                           
Develop Develop Alternative Design Assessment Methodology               
Mach Spa Investigate Machinery Space Lagging wrt Fire Protection         
Egress o .200
Int’l de .200
Hazard A .200
Develop .200
Mach Spa .200
Inconsistency Ratio =0.0
Determine the most appropriate fire research areas/projects.
RDC
Passenger Vessels Plex w/Derived Priorities
C -
 18
Node: 32000
Data with respect to:  TANKVSL < VSLADDR < GOAL
Egress o 1.
Int’l de 1.
Hazard A 1.
Develop 1.
Mach Spa 1.
Abbreviation Definition
Goal Determine the most appropriate fire research areas/projects.
VSLADDR Vessels Addressed                                               
TANKVSL Affect Tank vessels safety                                      
Egress o Egress of Passengers & Crew                                     
Int’l de International Design & Approvals Standards for Fire Protection Sy
Hazard A Hazard Analysis Review of Regulations                           
Develop Develop Alternative Design Assessment Methodology               
Mach Spa Investigate Machinery Space Lagging wrt Fire Protection         
Egress o .200
Int’l de .200
Hazard A .200
Develop .200
Mach Spa .200
Inconsistency Ratio =0.0
Determine the most appropriate fire research areas/projects.
RDC
Tank Vessels Plex w/Derived Priorities
C -
 19
Node: 33000
Data with respect to:  FISHVSL < VSLADDR < GOAL
Egress o .704
Int’l de .40741
Hazard A .704
Develop .704
Mach Spa 1.
Abbreviation Definition
Goal Determine the most appropriate fire research areas/projects.
VSLADDR Vessels Addressed                                               
FISHVSL Fishing Vessel safety                                           
Egress o Egress of Passengers & Crew                                     
Int’l de International Design & Approvals Standards for Fire Protection Sy
Hazard A Hazard Analysis Review of Regulations                           
Develop Develop Alternative Design Assessment Methodology               
Mach Spa Investigate Machinery Space Lagging wrt Fire Protection         
Egress o .200
Int’l de .116
Hazard A .200
Develop .200
Mach Spa .284
Inconsistency Ratio =0.0
Determine the most appropriate fire research areas/projects.
RDC
Fishing Vessels Plex w/Derived Priorities
C -
 20
Node: 34000
Data with respect to:  HCPV < VSLADDR < GOAL
Egress o 1.
Int’l de 1.
Hazard A 1.
Develop 1.
Mach Spa 1.
Abbreviation Definition
Goal Determine the most appropriate fire research areas/projects.
VSLADDR Vessels Addressed                                               
HCPV   High Capacity Passenger vessel                                  
Egress o Egress of Passengers & Crew                                     
Int’l de International Design & Approvals Standards for Fire Protection Sy
Hazard A Hazard Analysis Review of Regulations                           
Develop Develop Alternative Design Assessment Methodology               
Mach Spa Investigate Machinery Space Lagging wrt Fire Protection         
Egress o .200
Int’l de .200
Hazard A .200
Develop .200
Mach Spa .200
Inconsistency Ratio =0.0
Determine the most appropriate fire research areas/projects.
RDC
High Capacity Passenger Vessels Plex w/Derived Priorities
C -
 21
Node: 35000
Data with respect to:  HSCVSL < VSLADDR < GOAL
Egress o 1.
Int’l de 1.
Hazard A 1.
Develop 1.
Mach Spa .704
Abbreviation Definition
Goal Determine the most appropriate fire research areas/projects.
VSLADDR Vessels Addressed                                               
HSCVSL High Speed Craft Code vessels                                   
Egress o Egress of Passengers & Crew                                     
Int’l de International Design & Approvals Standards for Fire Protection Sy
Hazard A Hazard Analysis Review of Regulations                           
Develop Develop Alternative Design Assessment Methodology               
Mach Spa Investigate Machinery Space Lagging wrt Fire Protection         
Egress o .213
Int’l de .213
Hazard A .213
Develop .213
Mach Spa .150
Inconsistency Ratio =0.0
Determine the most appropriate fire research areas/projects.
RDC
High Speed Craft Code Vessels Plex w/Derived Priorities
C -
 22
Node: 36000
Data with respect to:  FERRY < VSLADDR < GOAL
Egress o 1.
Int’l de 1.
Hazard A 1.
Develop 1.
Mach Spa 1.
Abbreviation Definition
Goal Determine the most appropriate fire research areas/projects.
VSLADDR Vessels Addressed                                               
FERRY  Ferry Vessles                                                   
Egress o Egress of Passengers & Crew                                     
Int’l de International Design & Approvals Standards for Fire Protection Sy
Hazard A Hazard Analysis Review of Regulations                           
Develop Develop Alternative Design Assessment Methodology               
Mach Spa Investigate Machinery Space Lagging wrt Fire Protection         
Egress o .200
Int’l de .200
Hazard A .200
Develop .200
Mach Spa .200
Inconsistency Ratio =0.0
Determine the most appropriate fire research areas/projects.
RDC
Ferry Vessels Plex w/Derived Priorities
C -
 23
Node: 37000
Data with respect to:  OTHERVSL < VSLADDR < GOAL
Egress o 1.
Int’l de .704
Hazard A 1.
Develop .704
Mach Spa .704
Abbreviation Definition
Goal Determine the most appropriate fire research areas/projects.
VSLADDR Vessels Addressed                                               
OTHERVSL Other Vessel type.                                              
Egress o Egress of Passengers & Crew                                     
Int’l de International Design & Approvals Standards for Fire Protection Sy
Hazard A Hazard Analysis Review of Regulations                           
Develop Develop Alternative Design Assessment Methodology               
Mach Spa Investigate Machinery Space Lagging wrt Fire Protection         
Egress o .243
Int’l de .171
Hazard A .243
Develop .171
Mach Spa .171
Inconsistency Ratio =0.0
Determine the most appropriate fire research areas/projects.
RDC
Other Vessel Types Plex w/Derived Priorities
C -
 24
Node: 40000
Data with respect to:  POLLUTIO < GOAL
Egress o .11111
Int’l de .11111
Hazard A .704
Develop .407
Mach Spa .407
Abbreviation Definition
Goal Determine the most appropriate fire research areas/projects.
POLLUTIO Pollution Prevention potential.                                 
Egress o Egress of Passengers & Crew                                     
Int’l de International Design & Approvals Standards for Fire Protection Sy
Hazard A Hazard Analysis Review of Regulations                           
Develop Develop Alternative Design Assessment Methodology               
Mach Spa Investigate Machinery Space Lagging wrt Fire Protection         
Egress o .064
Int’l de .064
Hazard A .405
Develop .234
Mach Spa .234
Inconsistency Ratio =0.0
Determine the most appropriate fire research areas/projects.
RDC
Pollution Prevention Potential Plex w/Derived Priorities
C -
 25
Node: 50000
Data with respect to:  COLLISIO < GOAL
Egress o .11111
Int’l de .11111
Hazard A .11111
Develop .11111
Mach Spa .11111
Abbreviation Definition
Goal Determine the most appropriate fire research areas/projects.
COLLISIO Collision and Allision reduction potential.                     
Egress o Egress of Passengers & Crew                                     
Int’l de International Design & Approvals Standards for Fire Protection Sy
Hazard A Hazard Analysis Review of Regulations                           
Develop Develop Alternative Design Assessment Methodology               
Mach Spa Investigate Machinery Space Lagging wrt Fire Protection         
Egress o .200
Int’l de .200
Hazard A .200
Develop .200
Mach Spa .200
Inconsistency Ratio =0.0
Determine the most appropriate fire research areas/projects.
RDC
Collision and Allision Reduction Potential Plex w/Derived Priorities
